Government credit policy and industrial performance : Japanese machine tool producers, 1963-91 by Calomiris, Charles W. & Himmelberg, Charles P.
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  143-4
Government  Credit  Policy  Iriia~an~.  directed  cred--
:polrcy-for  the maochire  tools
and Industrial  Performance  ~ustywas  effectve  in
prom-otin4  Investment
1su.p0portng  growing  firms.
(Japanese Machine  Tool Producers,  cogigi  ivt  ~ns
1963-91)  and  avolding  capture  of
-policy  funds by particular
Charles  W. Calomiris  Tffns.  But  the eftfctiveness  of
Charles  P. Himmelberg  i~~~~~~~~~~:ndustrial  credit  policy  in-
,_JaPan_1s:probab1yconrs
-whierespecial  interest  lobbies
ra-ther  than.a  unified  national'
pl)an  shape  such  prograrns,
they  may  do more  harm  than
good-
The World Bankc

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH WORKING  PAPER 1434
Summary findings
Programs to direct credit to industry can be uniquely  helped to promote investment  among postwar Japanese
beneficial if (1) the purpose of government credir is to  machine cool producers. Important components of that
relax borrowing constraints on firms, as an end in itself  credit .seem  to have spurred growth. The government
(that is, if there is a capital market failure), or (2) other  credit programs did not crowd out private funds and did
government objectives  can best be achieved  by relaxing  not succeed by providing a permanent lifeline ("credit
firms' borrowing constraints (in which case, product and  insurance") to firms.
factor market externalities motivare govemment credit  But Calomiris and Himmelberg  do not endorse
programs)-  govemment interventions in credit markets. For one
According to Japanese officials,  government  thing, the effective  operation of industrial directed credit
involvement is warranted when:  in Japan seems to be an unrepresentative case. In many
* Investrnent  risk is too high for a particular activity  countries, such government intervention has produced
(because  it is too large-scale  or high-tech, or needs long  large costs: Inefficient  borrowers have been funded and
gestation and market development)-  public funds have been captured by special interests.
* There is a big discrepancy  between private and  In Japan, directed-credit policy is designed to promote
social benefits (when industries or parts of industries may  investment, crowd in private funds, and avoid the
save  foreign exchange, for example, and thus relieve  the  capture of policy funds by particular firms or industries.
balance of payments constraint on other growth  The priorities of credit policy  are determined as part of a
industries),  national plan with broad participation (rather than by
*  lnformation problems discourage Iending  to small  special-interest  lobbying),  and once industry-level
and medium-scale  industries.  priorities have  been established,  firm-level  lending
*  Infant industries face large social set-up costs.  dccisions by agencies  are shielded from political pressure.
Calomiris and Himmelberg examine the effect of  In political systems  that cannot implement such effective
policy-based  finance for the period 1963-91 for Japan's  plans for-distributing  industrial credit, government-
machine tool industry, an industry with high potential  directed credit programs may create more problems than
spillover effects on techmological  innovation and  they solve.
learning. They found that directed credit may have
This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Development  Department - is part of a larger  World Bank project on the
role of directed credit in East Asian industrialization.  Copies of this paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818
H StreetNW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Priscilla  In.ante, room G8-118, extension 37642 (62 pages).  March
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Japanese postwar industrial success coincided with a uniquely Japanese approach to
industrial policy and government directed credit,  which was part of that policy.  Recently, a
debate has been joined over whether government "targeting" (including credit policies) was an
integral contributor to the Japanese "miracle."  The World Bank (1993), and several articles
cited therein, take a sanguine view of industrial credit policy.  0 thers (Beason and Weinstein,
1993) argue that,  contrary to conventional wisdom, unique institutional features of Japanese
development  -- most  notably,  industrial  policy and  "main" banking -- actually  retarded  growth.
This paper considers general theoretical arguments that favor directed credit programs,
places them in the institutional and political context of postwar Japanese industrialization and
directed credit, and confronts theory with evidence.  We motivate and summarize the results of
an empirical study of industrial directed credit policy in the Japanese machine tool industry over
the last thirty years.  That period witnessed enormous progress in machine tool productivity and
growth in Japan, as well as in the Japanese economy more generally.  Our goal is to measure
and explain the potential contribution of directed credit to that growth.
Il.  INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL MARKETS  AND POLICY
Chandler  (1977)  has  emphasized large  potential economies of  scope  and  scale  in
production and distribution since the second industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century.
Recent analysis of Japanese industrial growth during the postwar period (Baily et al.,  1993;
Japan Development Bank,  1994) has emphasized that much of Japanese success in boosting
productivity in manufacturing rested on the ability to promote efficient, large-scale production.'
While not all of Japanese postwar manufacturing displayed increasing returns to scale, some of
the fastest growing, most R&D intensive manufacturers (notably in electrical machinery) faced
scale elasticities of roughly 1.4 (Nadiri and Prucha, 1990, Griliches and Mairesse, 1990).  A
central question of debate that surrounds recent Japanese success in manufacturing is the extent
to which it relied on Japanese industrial policy, and the extent to which government directed
credit policies were an important part of industrial policy.
Advocates of the importance  of directed credit to industry argue that the potential gains
to  society from concentrated investment in growing industries may be hard  to  reap without
goverrment  intervention.  Such investment typically involves substantial uncertainty about the
demand for products  and the costs of  production, particularly in  new,  growing  industries.
Large-scale production of new products using new technologies creates  special information
problems for the financial system.  Large-scale production implies greater needs for funds for
purposes the merits of which outsiders may be ill-equipped to judge.  Similarly, outsiders find
it costly to monitor and control the mgement  of large-scale enterprises engaged in complex
production and distribution processes.
Financial  intermediaries, of  course,  are  designed to  process  information,  raise  and
allocate funds,  and control the use of those fumds  by firms.  Clearly, delegation of monitoring
and control to intermediaries is cental  to the success of mobilizing fimds for industriaization.
But there are limits to the incentives private intermediaries face to finance all worthy projects.The  monitoring  costs of  infant industries  are front-loaded  toward  the present,  while  the profit
streams for these  industries  are back-loaded  into the future.  As Mayer  (1988)  has pointed  out,
if  internediaries  are unable  to count on a  long-tern  relationship  with a firm,  then they  will be
unwilling  to postpone  collection  of monitoring  fees  until the firm matures.  In this case,  viable
long-run  projects  will not be financed by private  internediaries.  One possible  reason  why firms
and banks  cannot credibly  commit  to a long-term  relationship  is that the initial  bank's  decision
to  grant  credit  to  the  firrn,  and  subsequent  renegotiations  of  credit  terms  with  the  firm,  are
publicly  observable.  Other banks, therefore,  may be able to learn about the firm's  credit  history
as  it becomes  "seasoned"  by  the  initial  bank.  Thus  subsequent  lenders  can  free  ride  on the
initial bank's  actions.  If  banks  can compete  for  an  initial bank's  customers  as  the customers
mature,  then  the  initial  bankl cannot  internalize  all  of  the  benefits  from  its  investments  in
information.  This prevents the initial bank from recouping  its front-loaded monitoring  costs over
time.  Mayer  (1988) argues  that banking  systems like Japan's  which grant banks greater  control
over firms may be able to solve this time-inconsistency  problem and thus provide greater  funding
to infant industries.  Calomiris  (1994) argues that under universal banking (concentrated  banking
systems in which banks can hold a variety of claims on, and offer many services to,  firms) banks
may be better  able  to internalize  the benefits  of initial  investments  in monitoring  firms.
The failure  of  private  intermediaries  to  supply  adequate credit  to  industrial  borrowers,
because  of this  free-rider  problem,  can justify  government  financing  of  "initial  bank"  lending.
Subsidies  to  initial  banks  can  compensate  for  the  front-loading  of  intermediation  costs  that
discourages lending to unseasoned  firms.  Alternatively,  the government  can go into the banking
business  itself,  as is the case in Japan,  where  the Japan  Development  Bank,  the Export-Import
Bank, and other govermnent-sponsored  authorities,  see themselves  as providing  directed  credits
as  "initial  oanks."  For  capital-constrained  firms,  assistance  that  relaxes  capital  constraints
directly may have  a more  potent effect  on economic  growth  than other forms  of  subsidy.
With  respect  to  externalities  across  firms,  it is  often  argued  that  product  and  factor
market  externalities  may be large in the industrial  sector, where technological  improvements  and
worker  training  can have important  spillover effects  across firms.  Thus in the industrial  sector
credit  constraints  can  have  a wider  social cost  in addition  to their  direct  effect  on constrained
entrepreneurs  -- they restrict  the development  of firms that would generate positive  externalities
for other  firms.
To  sum up,  there  are  two primary  justifications  given  for government  involvement  in
industrial  credit  programs,  both  of which  are traceable  to a failure  of private  credit  supply  to
finance worthy  projects.2 Credit programs  can have a uniquely  beneficial  role if (i) the purpose
of government  credit is to relax borrowing constraints  on firms as an end in itself,  or (ii) if other
government  objectives  can  be  best  achieved  by  relaxing  firms'  borrowing  constraints  (see
Calomiris and Himmelberg,  1994).  In the latter instance,  product and factor market  externalities
motivate government  assistance to firms.  In the former  instance, the justification  for government
credit programs  revolves  around  capital market  failure  per  se.
2III. ARE THESE MOTIVATIONS REAL?
Both  of  these  motivations  are  defensible  on  a  priori  grounds,  given  the  widespread
evidence  of  information  problems  in  capital  markets,  and  both  have  figured  prominently  in
arguments  about the benefits  of directed  credit  in Japan.
The experiences  of a wide variety  of countries over  different  eras support the notion  that
asymmetric  information  places  important  impediments  on frms'  abilities to invest,  particularly
during  early high-growth  phases  of production  (for reviews,  see Calomiris,  Himmelberg,  Kahn,
and  Vittas,  1992,  and Calomiris  and  Himmnelberg, 1994).  Corporate  financing  decisions  also
reflect  the importance  of  asymmetric  information  as  a constraint  on firms'  sources  of  fiunds.
Throughout  the  world,  internal  fiance  and  inside  (bank)  debt  are  the  dominant  sources  of
corporate  finance.
Several  recent  empirical  studies  of  Japanese  and  American  corporate  finance  have
emphasized  the  advantages  of  banking  relationships  (see  the  reviews  in  Calomiris  and
Himmelberg,  1994;  Calomiris,  1994),  particularly  under  the  'main-bank"  system  in  Japan
(Sheard,  1989; Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and Scharfstein  (1990a,  1990b,  1991).  These studies find  that
concentration  of debt and equity  holding,  as well as mermbership in a main bank-run  keiretsu,
allow  firms  to  invest  at  lower  cost  during  nonnal  times,  and  to  continue  investment  and
production  at much higher  levels  thar. other firms  during  episodes  of  financial distress?
The  stated  goals  of the Japanese  programs  have been  quite  compatible  with  defensible
theoretical  objectives,  based  on the presence  of capital constraints.  A recent  policy  statement
by  the  Japanese  Overseas  Economic  Cooperation  Fund  (OECF,  1991)  provides  motivations
which  are  closely  related  to  our  previous  theoretical  discussion  of the  role  of government  in
credit  supply.  The OECF's  list refers  specifically  to externalities  in production,  technological
development,  and factor markets,  and to  the benefits  of relaxing  fnancing  constraints  faced  by
growing  enterprises.  According  to the OECF statement,  government  involvement  is warranted
in the following  cases:
When the investment  risk is too high regarding  a particular  activity  (owing to the  need
for  large scale,  long gestation  period,  high  technology  and market  development).
*  When there  is significant  discrepancy  between private  and  social benefits  (e.g.,  in the
case of rural industries  that increase job  opportunities  in rural  areas and prevent  over-
concentration  in urban  regions).
*  In the case of industries  that may save foreign  exchange  and thus  relieve the balance
of payments  constraint  on other growth  industries.
*  In the  case of investment  for pollution  control  and environment  protection.
*  When  infant industries  face large  social set-up costs.
3*  When information problems discourage lending to small and medium scale industries.
Clearly,  there  is  a close correspondence between the  stated rationale for  industrial policy
intervention and the theoretical motivations discussed above.
A similar list of objectives appears in the Japan Development Bank's (1994) history of
postwar Japanese directed credit policy.  Interestingly, the JDB places particular emphasis on
its role as a "pump primer."  That is, it sees itself as an initial lender to unseasoned firms, and
looks to step aside once its borrowers' credit records are good enough to attract private funds.
From the perspective of Mayer's (1988) time-consistency  problem, one could argue that pump
priming requires a substantial government investment in monitoring costs, which are recouped
through the public benefits of helping firms to develop creditworthiness. The JDB explicitly sees
monitoring and "seasoning" as its key role in lending to infant industries, and prides itself on
its success in priming the pumps for private creditors.  The JDB also prides itself on the rapid
technological advancements and high rates of growth that targeted industries have achieved in
the post-War era.
Other authors have emphasized that pump priming often occurs immediately, as private
lenders join in government-sponsored  long-term credit syndications (Horiuchi and Sui,  1993).
The alleged "crowding in" of private creditors may be encouraged either by the government
agency's willingness to assume the costs of monitoring, or by the long duration of government
loans (which provides de facto "senior" status to private credits of shorter duration).
The Japan Development Bank (1994) survey of directed credit and industrial policy in
the post-War era also reveals faat anticipated product and factor market externalities  were centrl
to the sequence of assistance given to different industries.  In the 1950s the so-called "basic"
industries  - electricity,  iron  and  steel,  shipbuilding,  and  coal  mining  --  received  the bulk  of
fundmg because they were seen as industries that supplied basic inputs for growth in other
sectors. Once basic industries  were developed, the government  targeted manufacturing industries
-- notably machine tDols and automobile  parts - which were viewed as likely to provide spillover
benefits to other industries through technological changes and improvements in capital goods.
More recently, high-technology electronics firms have been supported for the same reasons. 4
The fact that one can imagine justifications for government credit policies traceable to
capital market imperfections, or that government officials focus on these justifications and on
sectoral success stories when explaining their policies, does not mean that such policies are a
good  idea.  First,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  assumptions necessary to  justify  government
involvement are met generally. In particular, developed  economies with relatively sophisticated
private capital markets may offer little opportunity  for beneficial govemment involvement. Even
more important, governments do not always "do the right thing,'  even iF  they espouse legitimate
objectives or possess comparative advantage.  For example, Brazilian capital market programs
(Gelb et al.,  1980) are an extreme (but not unrepresentative) example of how the political
economy of government assistance to industry can often result in rent-seeking, corruption, and
crowding out, rather than the pursit  of efficient industrial projects.  Clearly, empirical support
4for  directed  credit  policy  must  do more  than link credit  with  firm growth.  It must  show  that
credit  is directed  rationally,  that  permanent  capture  of government  funds  is avoided,  and  that
firm performance  is ultimately  linked to  its efficiency  as a producer.  In addition  to statistical
work,  therefore,  it is incumbent on researchers  to analyze the political  process of directed  credit
policy.
Furthermore,  before reaching  firm conclusions about the desirability  of industrial  credit,
directed  credit  programs  must  be evaluated  from  a general  equilibrium  perspective.  Even if a
program  leads to growth  in a particular  sector,  it may do so by crowding  out  growth  in other
sectors.  Similarly,  if growth  is achieved  through  the  granting  of  special  privileges,  or  the
imposition  of special government  regulations (e.g.,  consumption taxes in Japan),  one must weigh
any costs  associated  with these against any alleged  benefits to  the targeted  industry.
Thus,  despite the apparent  successes of Japanese development  and industrial  policy,  and
the apparent  consonance  between  the theory of welfare-improving  government  intervention  and
the stated policies  of Japanese  government  agencies,  there has been widespread skepticism  about
the benefits  of  Japanese  credit  programs,  both  within  and  outside  of Japan  (for  a review,  see
Vittas and Wang,  1991).  Some of that skepticism  revolves around other features  of the Japanese
economy,  which  some  economists  view as  mitigating  the  potential  explanatory  role of  credit
policies  for industrial  growth.
First,  even  economists  sympathetic  to the potential  constraints  posed  by capital  market
imperfections  may be skeptical  of the importance  of such problems  for Japanese  industry.  The
Japanese  private  main  bank  system  may be capable  of  "internalizing"  externalities  better  than
other  private  banking  systems  (Sheard,  1989,  Mayer,  1988).  The main  bank  system  is well
suited  to  capturing  the  long-run  benefits  of  short-run  investments  and  lending  policies,  for
several  reasons.  Time-consistency  in arrangements  between intermediaries  and their firms  may
be improved  by cooperation  among main banks  who participate  in multiple  lending  syndicates.
Main banks can use interbank  coordination to share benefits  and costs to compensate  lenders for
high  initial  monitoring  costs.  Also,  the main  bank's  corporate  control  devices  (especially  iis
power  as an equity  holder  in choosing  the Board  of Directors)  allow it to prevent  deviation  by
firms from prior  commitments.  Thus it may be particularly  hard to justify Japanese  government
credit  programs  on  the  basis  of  externalities  in  factor  and  product  markets,  or  information
externalities  due to  free riding  on monitoring  costs.
Skeptics also point to other aspects of Japanese industrial  policy -- tariffs,  Bank of Japan
"window  policy,"  and  other  policies  --  which  often  targeted  the  same  favored  sectors  that
received  credit  assistance,  and  offer  a competing  explanation  for  high  growth  rates  of  credit-
subsidized  sectors.  Clearly,  any  attempt  to  argue  the  merits  of directed  credit  from  data  on
sectoral performance  must disentangle the contributions  of credit from other government  policies
favoring  particular  sectors.
5IV.  EXISTING  EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE
With few exceptions, empirical analysis of Japanese industrial policy and directed credit
programs has been done at the sectoral, rather than the firm, level.  Kawaura (1992) and Ohno
(1992) show that industrial growth and directed credit were positively associated at the sectoral
level during the postwar period.  This conclusion has been questioned in recent research by
Beason and Weinstein (1993), who argue that relatively unproductive industries received large
shares of government assistance in a variety of fonns (tariff protection, subsidies, favored tax
treatment, and credit).  While the Beason and Weinstein paper provides an important antidote
to uncritical acceptance of the growth benefits of industrial policy, it is not useful for answering
the  question whether industrial credit policy promoted the  growth of  infant firms,  for  two
reasons.
FirsL,  as is clear in the Japan Development Bank (JDB, 1994) review of industrial policy
and directed credit, in many (and perhaps, most) cases, industrial credit policy has not been used
to  promote highly productive infant firms or  industries.  The Japanese plan often  targeted
industries for assistance because of their spillover effects for  other industries.  The logic of
Japanese industrial policy presumes a temporal ordering of development. That does not translate
into subsidizing the most productive sectors first, or  most.  Moreover, in addition to infant-
industry  motives,  the  Japanese have  sometimes targeted  assistance  directly  to  declining
industries, as a means to smooth adjustment.  Coal mining is a prominent example of a low-
productivity industry that received assistance  early on because of its perceived spillover potential
for initiating industrialization, and then received assistance later to permit smooth, orderly exit
of workers.  In neither case did the government conceive of,  or defend, its support for coal
mining on the basis of high productivity.  A better test of the success of infant-industry support
would focus on the examples of directed credit policy that were explicitly designed to improve
productivity in  technologically dynamic industries.  Prominent examples for postwar Japan
include machine tools and automobile parts (JDB, 1994).
Second, sectoral-level analysis is too crude a tool to measure the potential role of creuit
assistance in supporting "infant" firms.  Sectoral-level analysis cannot distinguish the effects of
credit policy from other policies.  Nor can it help one judge whether the firm-level allocation
of  credit by the Japan Development Bank (and other  government lenders) was effective in
promoting growth.
Horiuchi and Sui (1993) provide an important first step toward measuring the effects of
directed  credit on investment at the firm level.  They compare the  investment behavior of
"medium-size" firms receiving JDB assistance  during the period 1964-1988 with other firms of
similar size.  They find  that the year of  initial JDB lending was associated with  increased
investment, and that within three years firms began to move away from a reliance on JDB
lending to rely more on private banks.  Moreover, they find that the interest expense of firms
relying on the JDB was higher than non-JDB firms, which they interpret as evidence that JDB
interest subsidies were small.  This is consistent with 1DB data, which indicate a roughly one
percent interest rate subsidy on  credit (JDB, 1994).  These facts lend support to the JDB's
6accounts  of  "pump priming"  and  "crowding  in" of privat-' credit.5 Horiuchi and Sui (1993) also
find evidence  of capital growtlh (financed  by internal funds rather  than private  bank debt) prior
to,  as well as following,  receipt of JDB credit.  Their evidence  is consistent  with  (but does not
prove)  the view  that the JDB targeted capital  intensive, relatively  productive,  credit-constrained
firms.
Interestingly,  Horiuchi  and  Sui (1993) also find  (for a very  small sample  of firms)  that
firms  with  main bank  affiliations  that received IDB credit  did  not display the same reactions  in
their  investment  behavior  as  otlher firms.  Specifically,  main  bank-affiliated  firms  receiving
directed  credit  did not show  the same  incrcase  in investment after  JDB  intervention.  That fact
is consistent  with  Mayer's  (1988),  Sheard's  (1989),  and  Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and  Scharfstein's
(1990b)  arguments  about  the role of the main bank system  as a device  for resolving  free-rider
problems.  If main banks serve that useful function,  and if directed credit  is an alternative  means
to  resolve  free riding,  then one  would expect  directed  credit  to have  relatively  little  effect  on
main  bank-affiliated  firms.  Despite  their  small  sample,  and  their  mostly  informal  empirical
analysis,  Horiuchi  and Sui (1993) provide the first systematic quantitative  study of directed credit
at the firm level.  Their results are broadly  consistent with the stated objectives and perfornance
claims  of the JDB,  and with  the theoretical  motivations for directed credits  that rely on the free
rider problem.'  The empirical  work we discuss below,  like that of Horiuchi  and Sui (1993),  is
designed to address the questions  of the sources and consequences  of government  directed credit,
and to understand  the mechanism through  which directed credit  promotes  growth,  by focusing
on firm-level  data.
V. AN OVERVIEW  OF POSTWAR  INDUSTRIAL CREDIT POLICIES  IN JAPAN
Industrial  directed credit  programs  in Japan,  like other forms  of government  assistance
to  industry,  trace  their  intellectual  origins  to  the  aftermath  of World  War  Il.  The  Japanese
economy  was devastated  by the War,  and lacked  concentrations  of  financial  wealth  to  finance
the rebuilding  of the economy.  The Japan  Development  Bank  (1994)  describes  the history  of
early  attempts  to organize  directed credit  programs  during this period,  which  culminated  in the
establishment  of  the  Export-Import  Bank  and  the Japan  Development  Bank  as  the two  most
important  vehicles for providing credit  assistance to industry.7 Credit assistance  has always been
guided  by  the priorities  set by  the government's  five-year  plan.  The plan  outlines  sectors  on
which credit  assistance should be focused,  and credit is only one means of government  industrial
policy  toward  various  sectors.  Tariff  policy,  subsidies,  and  other  government  interventions
combine  with  credit  policy  to meet the overall  objectives  of the govermnent's  plan.
The  details  of  sectoral  resource  allocation  plans  are  achieved  through  an  elaborate
consultative  process  which involves "deliberative  councils"  and other advisory  bodies composed
of  industrialists,  workers,  academics,  bankers,  politicians  and  bureaucrats.  Participation  by
virtually  the  entire  industrial  sector  in this  process is compulsory.  Representatives  of  various
sectoral  interests  must make a case for prioritizing  their needs  in this national forum for debate.
In  contrast  to the  American  political  process,  where  Congressional  committees  are primarily
influenced  by special lobbying interests,  competing  interest groups in Japan  are forced to obtain
7national consensus for targeting their industry for assistance.  Once the broad guidelines are set
in place, firms applying for credit must meet the credit standards of the  individual lending
agencies,  who pride  themselves on  independence from govermnent pressure  in determining
which borrowers are worthy of credit.  Loans from government banks take the form of standard
loan contracts, and JDB officials view themselves as playing the same role as a private bank in
administering the loan and monitoring the firm (JDB, 1994).  Projects financed by directed
credit sometimes are financed through a syndicated loan involving private banks (Horiuchi and
Sui, 1993, p. 447).8
Consistent  with  the  lack  of  "capture"  in  Japan's  directed  credit  programs  and  the
independence  of its largest public lenders, the industries receiving assistance have changed over
short periods of time and the default record for firms receiving assistance has been remarkably
good.  As shown by the Japan Development Bank (1994), despite the fact that directed credit
has sometimes been the largest component of some industries' outstanding credit, and has taken
the fo,m of very long-term lending (typically in excess of 10 years), it has resulted in very few
loan defaults.  Indeed, the Japan Development Bank's default record of 0.01 percent for the high
industrial lending period of 1956-1965 is superior to that of private commercial banks whose
lending exposure was often less and whose loan durations were typically under 3 years.  The
Japan Development Bank's loan interest rates were also quite high, ranging typically between
1 and 2 percent below private rates.  Thus, at least from the standpoints of direct costs from
subsidies and defaults on government directed credit, Japan's credit programs have not suffered
the extreme costs typical of many other countries.
Even if one were convinced that Japanese directed credit avoided capture and high costs
of default, however, that does not prove that it caused industrial growth, or that in doing so it
provided a net social benefit.  Even for those who are convinced that directed credit promoted
growth in targeted firms, the mechanism through which credit operated is unclear.  Did credit
help firms because of its direct effect on finms' immediate access to funds,  or did it help by
convincing private lenders that the government was "insuring" the future of the recipient finn,
thus reducing the credit risk faced by  private lenders?  Some commentators on IDB policy
(Higano,  1986) have stressed the importance of the JDB's credible commitment to act as an
initial bank - monitoring and controlling the firm to protect its long-term debt.  Others (Sato,
1990) view JDB assistance as a signal that the government will provide credit insurance to
private banks if the firm falls into financial distress.  If the latter explanation were important,
that would raise the possibility that costly implicit bailouts and moral hazard problems were a
price for industrial growth fueled by directed credit.
Only a microeconomic analysis of the supply of directed credit, and the relative marginal
contributions  of  government  and  private  credit  supply to  capital  accumulation,  can provide  a
convincing assessment of the  contribution of  directed credit to Japanese post-World War II
industrial growth.  As we have argued, because it is difficult to  isolate the effects of credit
assistance at the industry level, firm level data are needed to test the effects of credit policy.
With  firm-level  data one can control for  industrial policies affecting whole industries, and
examine within-industry connections between govenment  credit and economic performance
8across firms.  In cooperation  with the Japanese government,  the Japan Developmenit Bank,  and
the  World  Bank,  Calomiris,  Himmelberg,  Kahn,  and  Vittas  (1992)  outlined  an  agenda  lor
collecting  and analyzing pancl data on Japanese firms.  That proposal emphasized  the importance
of collecting  dttailed  information  at the finn  level,  including  all  sources of credit,  t.  arrive  at
conclusions  about  the effectiveness  and potential  costs  of directed  credit.  The  data  collection
effort that  grew  out of that proposal  underlies  the empirical  work that follows."
VI.  A PANEL  STUDY  OF  MACHINE  TOOL  PRODUCERS
We have collected data on gov.._rnment  credit and finn  characteristics for the period  1963-
1991  for  machine  tool  producers  (defined  as  firms  producing  general  ma;hinery,  electrical
machinery,  precision  instruments,  and transportation  industry  parts,  which  correspond  to JDB
industry  codes  25,  27,  31,  and 29).  These  data  are from  publicly  available  annual  corporate
reports.  Our  principal  source  for  these  balance  sheet  and  income  data  is  the  "JDB  tape"
(available  for purchase  from  the JDB),  supplemented  for years prior  to 1982 with financial  data
collected  by hand from  individual corporate  annual reports,  wh1ich  were made available  through
a joint  effort by the World Bank and the Japan Development  Bank.  Dcspite the unique richness
of this data set -- particularly,  the identification of outstanding  balances to individual  lenders --
it has the important  limitation  of selection bias.  Only  survivors  are included  in the JDB  tape.
Firms  that exited  the  industry  prior  to  1991 are nowhere  present  in the data.  This  may make
the identification  of the  characteristics  of recipients  and the effects of government  credit  more
difficult,  particularly  during  the consolidation phase of the 1960s and 1970s when less productive
firms  exited  or were  acquired  by other firms.
Consistent  with  our emphasis  on industries  and  firms  in which  infant-industry  concernrs
motivated  directed  credit,  we  chose  to  focus  our  initial  investigation  on  the  experience  of
machinery  manufactures.  These firms were among the primary  targets of industrial policy  plans
during  the 1960s and 1970s.  Machine tool producers  underwent  substantial consolidation  during
the  1960s and  1970s,  which  was associated  with the  introduction  of new technologies  and  the
achievement  of  unusually  large  economies  of  scale  (Nadiri  and  Prucha,  1990).  The
technological  dynamism  of these industries also suggests the possible importance  of front-loaded
monitoring  costs, which  may lead to free-rider  problems  among intermediaries  discussed  above.
These  industries  may also have served  a  central  role in promoting  industrial  growth  in
other  sectors.  DeLong  and  Summers  (1992)  find  that  machine-tool  investment  is  strongly
correlated  with  long-term  economic  growth  (see  also  Rosenberg,  1972).  That  raises  the
intriguing  questions  of  whether  product  and  capital market  externalities  were  present  in  these
industries,  whether  firms  likely  to create  positive  externalities  were  targeted  by  government
fmance,  and whether  this may have contributed  to the dramatic  growth of industry  in post-War
Japan.  Although  measuring  such spillovers is not the focus of our study, potential  technological
spillovers  add to  the interest  in studying  the history  of machine tool producers.
Our  analysis  of  directed  credit  divides  into  seven  related  parts.  We  begin  by  (1)
describing  the composition  of  our dataset  and  (2)  outlining  broad  trends  in  the  machine  tool
9industry and its sources of credit during our sample period.  We then (3) examine the changing
concentration of directed credit over time within the industry, and (4) the frequency and duration
of the receipt of directed credit for the finns that received it.
(5) Using probit models, we analyze the characteristics of X  rms that predict which firms
became targeted for directed credit by government agencies.  We compare the characteristics of
targeted firms across government agencies and over time, and compare the lending patterns of
the main government lenders (the Japan Development Bank and the Export  -Import Bank) with
private  long-tenn creditors (the Industrial Bank of  Japan and the Long-Term Credit Bank).
These regressions help us to  identify economic characteristics of firms that made them more
likely to be chosen by the JDB and the Export-Import.  They also allow us to ask whether firms
that  received  a  first  round  of  directed  credit were more  likely  to  be  bailed  out by  their
government creditors if they experienced financial distress (the possible "moral hazard" problem
referred to above).
(6) Using panel vector autoregressions relating sales, earnings, investment, and various
sources of credit, we analyze the effect of an increase of government credit on fixed capital
investment, and compare the effects on investment  of increases in government and private credit.
Finally,  (7) we use the same method to estimate the effects of governent  credit on private
credit, to determine whether government credit "crowds out" or "crowds in" privately supplied
fumds.
Comlposition  of Panel and Industry Trends
Our data cover the period 1963-1991,  and include 8,156 firn-year observations. General
machinery accounts  for 3,561 observations,  electrical machinery for 3,327, precision instruments
for 734,  and transportation parts for 624.  After subtracting observations with missing values
and extreme outliers, we retained roughly 80 percent of our observations.  The percentage of
usable observations was roughly the same across the various sub-industry classifications.  The
percentage of usable observations, however, was larger for later years.  For the period 1963-
1971, 61 percent of observations were usable, compared to 81 percent for 1972-1981 and 85
percent for 1982-1991. Despite the apparently large number of observations within each of the
four sub-industries for the sample as a whole, for our purposes it was necessary to aggregate
across the sub-industries  to obtain sufficient numbers of observations  for various categories (e.g.,
recipient of JDB credit in the period 1963-1971).  In cases where it was possible to test for
behavioral differences across sub-industries, we found that our results were not very sensitive
to the inclusion or exclusion of a particular sub-industry.
As shown in Tables 1-3, Machine tool producers in the various sub-industries  experienced
similar trends and cycles over the period 1963-1991, as is evident in their average investment
rates, earnings-to-capital ratios,  and sales-to-capital ratios.  For industries 25, 27, and 31, the
sales-to-capital ratio peaks in 1970, then rises to a second smaller peak in 1981. For these same
industries, earnings-to-capital follows the same time path, while investment-to-capital  peaks in
1970 and  rises only  slightly  in the early  1980s.  For  industry 29,  the  sales-to-capital and
10earnings-to-capital  peaks come  in  1967-1968,  with  smaller  significant  rises  in  1974 and  1977;
investment-to-capital  peaks in 1968 and rebounds  in 1974 before continuing  its declining  trend.
For  all three  variables  and  all  four  industries,  the overall  trends  are  declining  after  the  early
1970s.
Machine  Tool Industry  Credit Trends
As  Table  4 shows,  sub-industries  varied  in the  relative  importance  of  long-term  credit
and its components,  but the sub-industry  averages were similar,  and the trends broadly the same.
Figures  1-8 plot the annual average  for our sample of the investment-to-capital  ratio  from  1964
to  1991 against  various  debt-to-apital  ratios.  Debt-to-capital  ratios are defined  for  total debt,
government  debt,  and private  long-term  and short-term  debt,  and for  the principal  components
of these  categories.  In our  discussion  we emphasize  patterns  in long-term  credit  (debts  with
greater  than one  year maturity),  which  one would  expect  to be  closely  linked to  the financing
of fixed  capital.
Mirroring  the downward trend of investment,  the trends  in credit and its components  are
declining over  the sample period.  From  1965 to  1974, investment  divided by capital  averaged
27 percent;  from  1975 to 1991,  it averaged  10 percent.  Over time there  is also a decline  in the
ratio of long-term  debt relative to capital.  Total long-term  credit  relative to capital fell from  an
average  of 41 percent  prior  to  1975 to 26 percent  afterwards.  This  likely  reflects,  in part,  the
maturing  of the industry and the substizution of internal  funds for debt  - operating  income over
capital  fell  over  time  as well,  but  by far  less (from  an average  of  19.5 percent  for  the period
1965-1974 to  an average  of  18 percent);  thus the slower  capital  accumulation  of the later  sub-
period  could  be more easily  financed  without  resort  to debt.
Directed  credit  was  a  small  proportion  of  total  long-term  credit.  Total  government-
agency  credit  fell  from  an  average  3 percent  of capital  prior  to  1978 to  one percent  after  the
mid-1980s.  The percentage decline  in total  government  credit  relative  to capital was similar  to
the decline  in iotal  private  credit  relative  to capital.  The decline in government  credit  relative
to  capital  reflected  both  a decline  in  the percentage  of firms  receiving  assistance,  and  in  the
govermment  debt-to-capital  ratios  of  borrowers,  except  in  industry  25  where  the  decline  was
almost entirely  due to the declining fraction  of firms receiving government  credit.  Overall,  for
1963-1971  79 percent  of firm-year  observations  showed positive  government  credit,  which fell
to 77  percent  for  1972-1981,  and 50 percent  for  1982-1991.
Within  the category of government  credit,  the relative roles of the principal  creditors also
changed  over  time.  Relative to one another,  the role of the Export-Import  Bank (XMB) waxed
as  that  of  the  JDB  waned.  The  percentage  of  finm-years  with  positive  JDB  credit  declined
markedly  from  39 percent  in the period  1963-1971,  to 24 percent  in the period  1972-1981,  and
12 percent  in the period  1982-1991.2o  For  recipients  of JDB credit,  the ratio  of JDB  credit  to
capital  fell from  4.1  for  1963-1971  to 2.5 percent  for  1972-1981 and  1.6 for  1982-1991.  The
Export-Inport  bank  maintained  positive  balances  for 6,  15, and 7 percent  of the observations,
for  the  three  consecutive  sub-periods,  respectively.  Not  only  did  the  percentage  of  XMB
11borrowing relationships rise over time relative to the JDB's, the ratio of XMB credit to capital
(for firms borrowing from the Export-Import Bank) rose from 1.6 percent for 1963-1971 to 3.4
percent for 1972-1981 and 3.1 percent for 1982-1991.
One interesting common  feature of all long-term credit providers, including the JDB, the
XMB, and private long-term creditors - notably the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) and the
Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) -- is the relative importance  of the same small number of years
for originating long-term borrowing relationships.  We define "spells" of borrowing from a
particular lender as episodes in which the balance owed goes from zero to positive and then
returns to zero.  By this definition, the six years from 1970 to 1975 account for 192 of the 438
spell beginnings for long-term lending in our dataset (from 1964 to 1991) for the aggregate of
JDB, XMB, IBJ, and LTCB spells.  The proportion of spells begun in those years is roughly
the same for each of the four major long-term creditors.  From the perspective of the history
of the industry, this coincided with a time of rapid growth and investment which began in 1968.
An  earlier  period  of  rapid  investment,  prior  to  1966,  also  coincided  with  a
disproportionate number of spell beginnings for the J1DB,  I1J,  LTCB, and (to a lesser extent)
the XMB.  During 1964 and 1965 alone, 28 of the JDB's 112 spells began, compared to 31 of
131 for the IBJ, 20 of 115 for the LTCB, and 5 of 80 for  fie XMB.
The amount of long-term credit and the timing of long-term credit spell beginnings shows
a clear link between fixed capital investment and long-term credit,  both public and private.
These data also show that,  in terms of the timing of long-term credit supply,  the principal
government and private providers were quite similar.  These patterns are especially visible in
the lending by the j-DB, IBJ, and LTCB.  It is worth emphasizing that these data indicate no
long-term "capture"  of  government funds by  the  machine tool  industry.  The timing and
changing degree of government credit were closely related to economic fundamentals in the
industry, and mirrored patterns of private credit suppliers.
Despite the common secular movements of long-term credit and investment, from year
to year there is little apparent association between the average investment ratio and any of the
government debt ratio averages.  This does not imply, however, that variation in  the supply of
govermnent credit was unimportant, for four reasons.  First,  these ratios are not time series
aggregates; they are simple averages across firms, and are not weighted by the size of frms.
If government credit were targeted to a few large firms, concentrated assistance to these firms
could conceivably have a large effect on investmnent  for the sector as a whole.  Second, because
government credit was always a small component of total credit, total investment for the industry
as a whole varied largely independently  of government credit.  Nevertheless, government credit
supplied at crucial moments to individual firms might have had important effects in stimulating
new technologies or promoting consolidations  which had lasting importance.  Third, the number
of firms for which we have usable data increases over time, as noted above; variation in the time
series behavior of the averages may reflect changes in the characteristics of firms that populate
the sample.  Fourth, govermnent credit supply may respond with a variable and distributed lag
to newly demonstrated opportunities  at the industry or firm level.  There is no reason to presume
12that  effective  directed  credit  must  precede  or  coincide  with  moments  of greatest  increase  in
private  investment  (in aggregate  or at the firm level).  For example,  directed credit  may simply
help  to  speed  implementation  of an  investment  plan  already  under  way."  Clearly,  there  are
liInitations  to what can be  learned  from  aggregate  statistics.  We now tum  to firm level data  to
take a closer  look at the nature  of the borrowing  relationship  between  goverrnent  lenders  and
firms,  at  the  economic  determinants  of  access  to  credit,  and  at  the  consequences  of  having
received  directed  credit.
Frequency  an-  Duration  of  Government  Credit  "Spells"
Here  we review  statistics  on the frequency and duration  of govermnent  credit  spells  for
firms  that received directed credit  from the Japan Development  Bank or the Export-Import  Bank
during  our  sample  period.  We  compute  the  duration  of  credit  spells  without  including
"truncated"  spells,  for which  beginning  and end dates are unknown  - those which begin  before
1964 and end  after  1991.
Most  firms  that  received  credit  from  the JDB  or the  XMB  only received  it once.  The
mean  number  of  credit  spells  for  1DB or  XM3  borrowing  are  1.19  and  1.21.  For  1DB
borrowers,  80.7  percent  received  only  one  spell,  18.8  percent  received  two  spells,  and  0.6
percent  received  three  spells.  For  XMB  borrowers,  81.6  percent  received  one  spell,  15.8
percent  received  two  spells,  and  2.6  percent  received  three  spells.  These data  are  similar  to
those for private  long-term  credit  spells from the IBJ and LTCB.  For these lenders, the mnuber
of spells  averaged  1.12 and  1.15;  the frequency  of one,  two,  and three spells were  88.9,  10.6,
and 0.6  percent  for  the IBJ,  and  86.8,  11.2,  and 2.0  percent  for the LTCB.
The  duration  of  63 non-truncated  credit  spells  for  the 3DB averaged  7.6  years,  with  a
standard  deviation  of  4.1  years.  The  median  spell  length  was  7  years,  the  maximum  and
minimum  spell lengths  were  17 years  and  one  year,  and  the  25th  and  75th  percentiles  of  the
distribution  were 5 and  10 year spells.  For the XMB,  66 non-truncated  credit  spells  averaged
6.2  years,  with  a standard  deviation  of 3.2  years.  The median  spell  length  was 6 years,  the
maximum  and  minimum  were  17 years  and  one year,  and the 25th  and 75th  percentiles  of the
distribution  were  4 and  8 years.
The  durations  of  spells for  the IBJ and LTCB  were  similar  on average  to  those  for  the
XMB  and  JDB,  but the private  long-term  bank  spell duration  distnrbutions were more  skewed.
For  the  IBJ,  the  mean  duration  of  58  non-truncated  spells  was  7.1  years,  with  a  standard
deviation  of 5.5 years.  The median  was 5 years,  the maximum  and minimum  were 24 years  and
one  year,  and  the  25th  and  75th  percentiles  were  4  and  10 years.  The  mean  for  65  non-
truncated  LTCB  speRls  was 7.2  years,  with  a standard  deviation  of 4.5  years.  The median  was
6  years,  the  maximum  and  minimum  were  19 years  and  one  year,  and  the  25th  and  75th
percentiles  were  3 and  11 years.
We also calculated  statistcs  for  "joint" directed-credit  spells  involving  borrowing  from
one or both  of the two main government  agencies.  For these calculations,  a spell is defined  as
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returning to a zero balance.  The mean number of spells for firms receiving directed credit from
one or both intermediaries  was 1.3.  72.8 percent of firms received only one speli, 25.7 received
two spells, and 1.6 percent received three.  The duration of 91 non-truncated spells averaged
7.3 years, with a standard deviation of 4.2 years.  The median spell length was 7 years, the
maximum and minimum spell lengths were 17 and one year, and the 25th and 75th percentiles
were 4 and 10 years.  The close correspondence between the data on the frequency and duration
of directed-credit spells for the JDB or XMB alone, and the frequency and duration of joint
spells, indicates that firms receiving credit from both lenders typically received that credit within
a single spell, and that the interaction of the two lenders did not lead to a significant prolonging
of the duration of spells.
In our previous discussion of sectoral trends in directed credit, we showed that there was
no long-term "capture" of govermnent funds by machine tool producers as an industry.  The data
on the frequency and duration of spells show that this conclusion also holds at the level of
individual firms' access to government fimds.  Directed credit (whether by the JDB, the XMB,
or both) was usually provided to a firm only once and it lasted for a brief period.  Relative to
the behavior of private long-term creditors, the XMB and JDB did not tend to lend to the same
firm more frequently or for longer periods.  To the extent to which the 1DB and XMB lent to
the same firm, that cooperation  did not tend to have a large impact on the duration or frequency
of directed-credit spells.
It is importan; to note that the exclusion of truncated spells for computing the duration
of borrowing spells biases all the estimated duration lengths downward substantially.  Includinlg
tuncated  spells (which were typically much longer than non-truncated spells) raises the average
and  median spell lengths for all  intermediaries, as well as the  standard deviations of  spell
lengths.  Including truncated spells, however, does not substantially change the data for directed
credit duration reported above.  Moreover, truncated spells of the IBJ and LTCB were much
longer on average than those for the JDB and XMB, and much more common.  Thus, adding
truncated spells to our comparisons simply strengthens our conclusion that directed-credit spells
were not long in comparison to private long-term credit spells.
Who Receives Government Credit?
In this section, we examine the quantifiable characteristics of fiTms  that received directed
credit, based on data from balance sheets and income statements.  While we will argue that it
is difficult to derive conclusive interpretations about the goals of government policy from probit
estimates of  recipient characteristics,  our  results have two  broad  applications.  First,  by
establishing the characteristics  of recipients of directed credit, we provide basic quantitative facts
which must be reconciled with qualitative interpretations of the  intentions of directed credit
policy,  whether  sanguine or  jaundiced.  Second,  we  are  able  to  examine  Sato's  (1990)
proposition that govemment creditors provide insurance to private creditors by being willing to
bail out private creditors of fums which have borrowed from govermnment  creditors.  Our probit
evidence is inconsistent with that proposition, at least as applied to the machine tool industry.
14We  examine  the  question  of  who  receives  government  credit  by  asking  whether
potentially  interesting  balance  sheet and  income  statement  measures  (1)  preceded  the onset  of
a directed-credit  spell;  (2) preceded observations  of positive outstanding balances  of government
credit;  and  (3)  preceded  decreases  or  increases  in  directed  credit  (using  an  ordered  probit
model).  In answering  each  of these questions,  where  possible  we examined  the sensitivity  of
our results to specific  periods and specific  intermediaries  by dividing  our sample into three sub-
periods  (1963-1971,  1972-1981,  1982-1991),  and by investigating differences  among  the JDB,
the XMB,  and  other  government  creditors  in their  selection criteria.  Throughout,  we use the
IBJ and  LTCB  as  benchmarks  for  comparison  and  contrast,  to  highlight  features  of  directed
credit  targeting  that differed  from private  long-term  credit  targeting.
Candidate  measures  of firm characteristics  we considered  include:  firm size (the natural
log of sales),  the investment  rate (fixed investment  divided  by fixed capital),  the ratio of sales
to fixed capital,  the ratio of operating  income  to fixed capital,  and the growth  rate of sales (the
log difference  of sales).  In all the probits,  these variables  are lagged relative  to  the period for
which  dependent  variables  are defined.
Given  the descriptions  of the use of directed  credit to machine tool producers  to promote
technological  innovation,  we wanted to include expenditures  on research and development  in our
measures  of firn  characteristics.  but  we found that  the data  reported  by  fnrms on this  variable
were  not  reliable.  In  many  cases,  firns  reported  zero  expenditures  on  research  and
development,  and  the  pattern  of  these zero  observations  over  time  suggests  that  most  of  the
variation  observed  within the panel is the  result of changes  in accounting  over  time.  It  seems
that only by the mid-1980s  did most firms make a serious attempt to report R&D  expenditures.
Reported  R&D  expenditures  are zero for  all firms  until  1969.  Reported  R&D expenditures  in
aggregate  tripled  from  1974 to 1980, doubled from  1980 to 1983, then doubled again from  1983
to  1985.  Clearly,  given  the importance  of R&D for machine tool producers  prior  to the 1980s,
these  data  reflect  improved  reporting  practices  over  time  rather  than  changes  in  economic
fundamentals.  Regrettably,  this means the data  cannot  be used as consistent  measures  for our
panel.  Judging  from  the rate of change of aggregate  expenditures,  reporting  changes  dominate
the variation  within the panel until  the period  after  1986.
Economic  interpretations  of significant positive  or negative effects  from each of our five
measures  of firm  characteristics  are not s raightforward.  For example,  large firm  size could be
interpreted  (from  a  sanguine  perspective)  as  evidence  that  government  credit  was  used  to
promote  efficient  consolidation,  economies  of scale,  and  technological externalities  in machine
tool  production  (which  was  exactly  what  the  government  explicitly  claimed  it  was  doing).
Alternatively,  (from  a jaundiced  perspective)  large  frm  size could be  viewed as a measure  of
the political  influence  of the borrower,  or an indicator  of excessively  conservative  bureaucratic
behavior  (lend only  to well-es.ablished,  low-risk  firms  whose prospects  are well known).
The same difficulties  arise with  each of the other  four measures.  A high  sales growth
rate  or  high  investment  rate  can  be  viewed  either  as  a  measure  of  a  firm's  progressive
technology,  or  of  it's  low  credit  risk.  High  earnings  may  measure  high  private  reurns  to
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alternatively, may measure low risk to the lender.  A low sales-to-capital ratio may indicate a
more capital-intensive production process, or a more mature stage of growth (after the firm has
had a chance to catch up to increasing sales).
Even  if  the  economic  meaning of  these  five  variables  were  unambiguous,  other
considerations make it difficult to evaluate policy on the basis of the observed characteristics of
borrowers.  Do these measures indicate "demand-side" characteristics of directed-credit firms
(high  sales growth  implies  high demand for  funds  from  all  sources),  or  do  they  reflect
government decisions about which firms should receive funds?  Would a wise and beneficent
govermnent lender trying to spur consolidation lend to firms at the beginning of the process or
after the firms have demonstrated a commitment to it by devoting some of their own resources
to the strategy?
Rather than agonize over every possible interpretation of the various probit specifications,
our strategy in reporting our results will be to summarize them briefly, discuss their robustness
across lenders and over time, and emphasize conclusions that can be drawn most easily from the
results.
Our first set of results address the question of what firm characteristics are associated
with the onset of a credit spell.  We will refer to these probits as the START regressions.  For
these regressions, our sample excludes all "left-truncated" firms - those that began the sample
period with positive balances of credit from the relevant government lender.  Obviously, for
these firms, we cannot analyze the factors associated with the beginning of a government credit
spell.  To economize on language, here and elsewhere, we will refer to results with levels of
significance of 5 percent or less without any qualification; coefficients with significance levels
of between 5 and 20 percent will be referred to as weak;  other effects will be described as
"zero."  Details are presented in the tables.
Our data on outstanding loan balances of firms to individual  intermediaries for the period
prior to  1982 were collected by hand.  To make this task manageable, we confined ourselves
to collecting data on only four intermediaries  - the JDB, XMIB,  IBJ, and LTCB.  It is important
to note that the number of JDB and XMB spells used in the probits is much smaller than the
number of actual spells.  Only 50 JDB spells and 60 XMB spells were used; outlier rules for
discarding observations led to the elimination of nearly half the directed-credit spells.  Clearly,
this was not a random phenomenon.  One possibility is that unusual events (like mergers or
acquisitions) associated with dramatic changes in balance sheet or income measures tended to
precede govermment  credit spells.  This is an extremely interesting possibility, but one which
our current data source does not allow us to examine.  The reduction in usable observations of
spells made it impossible to estimate START regressions for the 1DB and XMB for the three
sub-periods separately.
Table 5  reports  START probits  for  our entire  sample period for  each  of  the  four
intermediaries  we analyze separately, and for "lD-XM" spells - those involving either the JDB,
16the XMB, or both.  For the JDB, the one-year lag of the sales-to-capital ratio enters negatively
as a predictor of spells, the one-year lag of the investment rate enters positively, and lagged
sales growth and fm  size both enter weakly positively.  For the XMB3,  the results are similar,
but the levels of significance vary between the two.  The XMB START probits give similar
weight to investment rates,  less importance to the sales-to-capital ratio and sales growth rate,
and more to firm size.  The JD-XM START probits tend to reflect the JDB results more, with
a weak negative effect from the sales-to-capital ratio, and positive effects from the investment
rate and sales growth.  Overall, these results indicate that growing, large, capital-intensive firms
with high rates of investment tend to be the most likely recipients of directed credit.
Interestingly, the results  for the IBJ and LTCB are  quite different.  Although these
lenders also targeted investment-intensive  firms with high sales growth, their new borrowers tend
to be smaller firms with higher sales-to-capital  ratios and lower earnings-to-capital  ratios.  One
interpretation of these results is that IBJ and LTCB firms are at an earlier stage of growth and
investment, in which capital has not yet caught up to sales and size is still small.  The negative
earnings effects may also indicate a greater need for credit to  support investment for these
borrowers.
Our next set of probits define the dependent variable as taking a value of one  if the
current firm-year observation shows positive outstanding credit from a particular intermediary
or set of intermnediaries;  zero otherwise.  In contrast to the START probits, the definition of the
dependent variable in these HAVE probits results in many observations where the dependent
variable is unity.  That follows from the fact that there are more periods in which balances are
positive than there are beginnings of spells, and from the fact that we are able to include "left-
truncated" firms in the HAVE probits.  The large number of firm-year observations for which
the HAVE indicator is one allows us to measure the sensitivity of our results across our three
sub-periods.  Also, we are able to report HAVE probit results for govermment  credit as a whole,
in addition to results for the JDB and XMB individually.
There is a natural interpretation of differences  or similarities between START and HAVE
probits.  To the extent the results are the same, that indicates that the identifiable characteristics
of firms receiving govermment  credit were observable prior to the receipt of government credit.
To the extent the START and HAVE probits differ, that suggests that the receipt of government
credit was associated with changes in the characteristics of borrowers.
Tables 6-8 report HAVE probits for the JDB, the XMB, government credit as a whole,
the IBJ, and the LTCB.  The HAVE probits for the JDB and XMB in Table 6 for the entire
period are very similar to the START probits.  The HAVE results, however, show significantly
larger coefficients (in absolute value) for the negative sales-to-capital ratio effect and the positive
size effect.  In the case of the JDB, the positive investment rate coefficient is also much larger.
Earnings-to-capital  ratio coefficients (which were insignificant before) are now much larger and
more significant, and of  opposite sign for the JDB and XMB.  On the whole,  these results
suggest that the characteristics that gave rise to directed credit spells may have been reinforced
by the receipt of directed credit.  From the standpoint of the sanguine view of directed credit,
17this  is  consistent  with  the  interpretation  that  directed  credit  reinforced  the  process  of
consolidation, investment, and technological change of targeted firms.
Interestingly,  government credit  as  a  whole from  all  sources  was  not significantly
associated with  firm  size.  This  is not  surprising, since some government credit providers
targeted firms using criteria very different from the JDB or XMB.  For example, directed credit
for  small businesses obviously would not  have been available to  large  firms.  Sub-period
breakdowns for govermnent credit, XMB credit, and JDB credit HAVE probits reported in Table
7 occasionally show significant differences in coefficient  size or statistical significance. Overall,
however, the strongest results for the whole period tend to be qualitatively robust to period-by-
period breakdowns.
The 1980s, however, display some important differences relative to earlier periods, as
shown in Table 7.  The coefficient on the lagged investment rate is less positive and possibly
negative,  the  positive sales-to-capital ratio  effect  is  muted,  and  the  positive sales growth
coefficient is larger.  These patterns are visible for all the HAVE probits for government credit
for the 1980s. This suggests a possible change in government credit policy during the latter part
of our sample. 12
Results of HAVE probits for the  LTCB and IBJ  in Tables  6 and 8 are  different in
important respects from those of government providers, and the comparisons between START
and HAVE probits are also quite different for the LTCB and IBJ.  In general, the coefficients
for the  IBJ and LTCB HAVE probits  are not larger in absolute value than the comparable
START coefficients.  Indeed,  in  several cases,  the coefficients are  significantly smaller in
absolute value, or of reverse sign.  Firms receiving LTCB or IBJ credit saw reductions in their
sales-to-capital ratios upon receiving credit.  Most interesting, however, is the reversal in the
size effect.  While firms receiving credit from the IBJ and LTCB were smaller than average
(controlling for other effects), during their credit spells they were larger than average.  These
diffe[ences in coefficient sign and magnitude for size and sales-to-capital ratio effects between
the START and HAVE probits lend support to the possibility that the LTCB and IBJ were
willing to provide long-term credit at an earlier stage of the process of expansion/consolidation
than were the JDB and XMB.
The period-by-period breakdowns for the IBJ and LTCB HAVE probits in Table 8 show
substantial changes across periods in the coefficients on investment rates and sales growth.  Like
the  results  for government credit,  the  investment rate coefficient switches from positive to
negative in the 1980s. A positive sales growth effect is largely confined to the IBJ in the period
1963-1971; otherwise sales growth effects are either zero or negative.
We also estimated, but do not report, a set of ordered probit regressions to investigate
firm characteristics associated with changes in the amount of outstanding government credit
qualitatively.  Here the dependent variable takes a value of one if a credit balance increases, a
value of zero if it remains constant, and a value of negative one if it falls.  In these probits we
sought to measure how fast credit responded to changes in firm characteristics, and thus included
18contemporaneous  observations  and  one,  two,  and  three  year  lags  of  sales-to-capital  ratios,
earnings-to-capital  ratios,  and  investment rates.  Given  the multiple  sales-to-capital  regressors,
sales growth  would have been redundant,  and thus was excluded.  Firm size (log sales) was also
excluded  for similar  reasons.
For  the  most  part,  results  for  the  ordered  probits  on  changes  in  directed  credit  were
qualitatively  similar  to the HAVE  probits.  The most interesting finding from the ordered  probits
for  government  credit  was the importance  of distant  lags in determining  increases  or decreases
in credit.  For  the JDB  and  XMB,  the largest  and  most  significant  positive  effects  associated
with  investment  rates were  for lags of two and three years,  and these effects  tended  to be larger
and  more significant  in the first  two sub-periods.  Interestingly,  we found  that  investment  rate
effects  in  ordered  probits  for  the IBJ and  LTCB  also  showed  greatest  sensitivity  to  the most
distant  lags,  and  this  effect  was concentrated  in the first  two  sub-periods.  Once  again,  these
results are supportive  of the conclusion that directed credit for machine tool producers  reinforced
a process  of fixed capital  investment  that was largely  prior  to the receipt  of government  credit,
although  in this  respect the ordered probit  results provide  less contrast between  the behavior  of
private and government  providers  of long-term  credit than the HAVE probits.  Period-by-period
breakdowns  echo those  of the HAVE  probits.  The  1980s showed weaker  effects  from  lagged
investment  or sales-to-capital  ratios than for earlier  periods.
Our analysis  thus  far of the characteristics  of firms  beginning  spells,  receiving  positive
credit,  or receiving changes in credit,  provide interesting,  if somewhat inconclusive,  insights into
the  behavior  of  government  intermediaries  during  our  period,  and  the  differences  between
government  and private  long-term  credit supply.  The most fundamental  and clear  findings  are
that  (1) quantifiable  economic  characteristics  of  firms  were  associated  with  the  likelihood  of
receiving government  credit;  (2) both in an absolute sense, and relative to the behavior  of private
long-term  lenders,  long-term  directed  credit  tended  to  provide assistance  only  after  firms  had
already undertaken  substantial  investment and consolidation;  (3) directed credit policy during the
1980s was different  from  earlier  periods,  as indicated  by muted  or  zero effects  of low lagged
sales-to-capital  ratios  or high  lagged  investment  rates in making  credit  or  an increase  in credit
more  likely.
We turn  now to Sato's  (1990) hypothesis  about the effects of directed  credit  on  private
credit  risks,  and its  implicit  assumptions  about government  lending policy.  Sato's  view  is that
government  lenders  provide  implicit  protection  to  private  lenders.  Once  a  firm  has  received
directed  credit,  private  lenders expect that if the firm experiences  financial distress,  government
creditors  will  infuse  the firm  with new loans,  effectively  protecting  private  lenders.
Our earlier discussion  of the descriptive statistics  of government  credit  cast doubt on this
view.  We found  that roughly  80 percent  of frms  received  directed  credit  only  once,  and that
the duration of credit was typically  short relative to private  long-term  credit.  At least in the case
of  the machine  tool  industry,  there  seems to  be  little evidence  of the government  singling  out
a few  firms  for  repeated  access to funds.
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whether firms receiving a directed credit spell from a lender for the second or third time are
forced to meet the same, or lower, standards of credit than first-time borrowers.  This question
is addressed in the probit results reported in Table 9.  After controlling for firm characteristics
(discussed above), which affect the likelihood of receiving government credit, firms that have
already received fnuancing  from the JDB are less likely to receive it again from the JDB, while
firms that have received credit from the XMB are equally likely to receive it again.  In neither
case are govermnent lenders willing to relax credit standards for previous borrowers.  Given the
coefficients on  the  firm characteristic regressors,  (1) firms  experiencing declining  sales or
declining investment are always less likely to receive credit from the JDB or XMB, and (2) the
criteria for second- and third-time borrowers are even more stringent (in the case of the JDB)
or equally stringent (in the case of the XMB).
Interestingly, the cross-intermediary  effects are significant and positive, both for the JDB
and the XMB.  For both government lenders, borrowers that have received credit previously
from the other government lender are more likely to receive a new loan, all other things equal.
But this is not because one intermediary is bailing out the other one's distressed firms.  As
shown in the JD-XM probit, if one looks at joint credit spells, the effects of previous borrowings
from either intermediary are negative or zero.  This is inconsistent with the "Sato conjecture,"
but quite consistent with what we already saw in the statistics for the frequency and duration of
joint JD-XM spells.  They were mainly simultaneous  targetings of firms (resulting from similar
targeting objectives), not sequential spells.  Recall that the average length of joint non-truncated
spells was 7.3 years (slightly shorter than the average length of JDB spells) and that most firms
received only one joint spell.
Government  Credit and Investment
In Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994), we reported preliminary findings for the period
1982-1991 of the effects of government directed credit flows on fixed investment and private
long-term credit.  That  study found large  and statistically significant positive effects from
directed credit on fixed investment (in a reduced form, VAR model), and large  "crowding in"
of long-term private credit by government lending.  Our results here share some features with
those reported before, but differ in important ways.
Our definitions of fixed investnent and total government and private long-term credit
flows are the same as before.  We define "net'  fixed investnent as gross fixed investment net
of asset sales. Long-term private credit includes all long-term credit from commercial banks and
long-term credit banks (which includes the IBJ and  LTCB).  All credit flow  measures are
defined  as  changes  in  outstanding credit,  and  credit  flows  and  investment  flows  are  all
normalized by the lagged stock of fixed capital.
Our earlier study did not examine data prior to 1982, and did not distinguish effects from
government credit according to the lender making the loan.  The results from the VARs we
report here examine the period 1963-1991 - and the three sub-periods 1963-1971, 1972-1981,
20and  1982-1991  -- and  compare  the effects  of  individual  providers  of government  and  private
long-term  credit.
Our  earlier  study  used  the  GMM  fixed-effects  estimator  suggested  by  Holtz-Eakin,
Newey  and Rosen  (1988).  This estimator was designed to take accou.it  of firm fixed effects  by
differencing  them out of the regression  analysis.  Because such differencing  iniduces correlation
between  the  error  term  and  the  regressors  (and  hence  biases  estimated  coefficients),  Holtz-
Eaken,  Newey  and  Rosen  (1988)  suggest  the use  of  distant  lags  of  regressors  (in  levels)  as
instruments  for  the differenced  regressors.
Since writing  our first  paper,  we have changed  our  view of the relative  merits  of using
the  Holtz-Eakin,  Newey  and  Rosen  estimator  for  our  purposes.  Our  change  in  method
reflections  econometric,  as  well  as  economic,  concerns.  From  an  econometric  standpoint,
Himmelberg  (1994) has shown using Monte  Carlo simulations  that the Holtz-Eakin,  Newey and
Rosen  estimator,  while asymptotically  efficient,  is prone  to  large errors  in small samples  when
compared  to  Himmelberg's  alternative  GMM  estimator  (whirh  imposes  additional  restrictions
on the GMM  weighting  matrix)  or to two-stage  least squares  instrumenting.
From  a  theoretical  standpoint,  there  are  also  problems  with  estimating  the effects  of
instrumented  government  credit  to  infer  the  effects  of  government  credit.  Instrumented
government  credit  captures only the predictable  component  of credit policy.  One might expect,
under  rational expectations,  that the unpredictable  component  of credit  policy would have larger
effects,  since frms  known  to be  more  likely  to  receive government  assistance  may be  able to
attract  some private  credit  in anticipation  of government  funds.
These  considerations  suggest  that  there  may  be  large  costs  associated  with  trying  to
control  for firm fixed effects through  differencing  and instrumenting.  Furthermore,  the benefits
of  controlling  for  fixed  effects  by  differencing  and  insrmenting  may  be  small.  Lagged
endog,enous  vanables  should  be  highly  correlated  with  firm  fixed  effects,  and should  capture
much  of the  influence  of the  fLxed effect.  The  most  important  cost  of not  eliminating  fixed
effects  is the  inability  to estimate  long-term  effects,  because  ftxed  effects  influence  estimated
coefficients  on  lagged  endogenous  variables.  Because  fixed  effects  and  lagged  endogenous
variables  are positively  correlated,  estimated  coefficients  on lagged  endogenous  variables  will
be too large when the fixed effect is not eliminated.  and thus will exaggerate  the long-term  effect
on the endogenous  variable  of changes  in the regressors.
One  way  to  test for  the potential  importance  of  fixed  effects  is to  compare  estimated
lagged  endogenous  coefficients  between  'level"  and  "instrumented  difference"  specifications.
Using  two-stage  least squares  for  instrumenting,  we found  that  fixed  effects  did  significantly
increase  estimated  lagged endogenous  coefficients  in the simple level  regressions.  Estimates  of
lagged  endogenous  coefficients  after  differencing  out  fixed  effects  were  negative,  ranging
between  zero  and  -0.5,  while  those  estimated  without  controlling  for  fixed  effects  ranged
between  0.1  and  0.8.  This  suggests  that  fixed  effects  are  important,  and  that  the  lagged
endogenous  variables  reported  in our regression  results should not be used to calculate long-term
21effects.  For our purposes,  however,  we are most interested  in detecting  whether  there are large,
significant  effects  among  government  credit,  investment,  and  private  credit;  precise  measures
of  long-term  effects  are less  important.  For  these  reasons,  in Tables  10-15 we report  results
from simple panel VARs without attempting  to control for fixed effects through  differencing  and
instrumenting.
In  our  investment  regressions,  reported  in  Tables  10 and  11,  fixed  investment  is  the
depcndent  variable.  Dependent and independent  variables are all normalized  by the lagged stock
of fixed  capital.  Independent  variables  include  current  and  lagged  sales  and  earnings,  as well
as a host of current  and lagged credit  flow measures.  Credit flows are divided  into three broad
categories:  (long-terrn)  government  credit,  long-term  private  credit,  and  short-term  private
credit.
We  report  some  specifications  that  include  credit  flows  from  individual  government
lenders  (the JDB  and XMB)  and long-term  private  lenders  (the IBJ and  LTCB),  as well as  the
three  broad  categories  of  credit  flows.  Earnings  and  sales  effects  are  included  as  control
variables  to  isolate  the  effects  of  changes  in  credit  flows  unrelated  to  these  fundamentals.
Private  credit  flows  are  included  for  comparison  to  examine  whether  positive  effects  of
government  credit  on investment  are large relative  to comparable  innovations  in private  credit.
Including  current  as well as lagged credit  flows implicitly assumes that credit  flows are causally
prior  to investment.  This  is an unrealistically  extreme  assumption,  of course,  but  it is a useful
one for  our purposes.  This assumption  allows  us to ask whether government  and private  credit
flows have  different  strengths  of  association  with  current-year  and  next-year  investment,  after
controlling  for  earnings  and  sales.  For  example,  a  finding  of  a  relatively  large  effect  from
govermnent  credit  would  be consistent  with  viewing  government  credit  as relaxing  borrowing
constraints  and  private  credit  as mainly  responding  passively  to  the fundamental  determinants
of investmnent opportunities  (sales,  earnings,  and  lagged investment).
When  individual  intermediaries  are  included,  their  coefficients  measure  the  extent  to
which  that  intermediary  differs  from  other  lenders  in the same broad  class.  Thus  if the lagged
coefficient  on broad  government  credit were 0.5  and the comparable  coefficients  on the JDB and
XMB  were  zero that  would mean that the predictive  effect  of government  credit  on investment
was 0.5  for the JDB  and XMB,  as well as for other government  lenders.
For  the entire  period,  and each sub-period,  we report  two different  specifications.  The
first  (reported  in Table  10) includes only the broad  credit flow measures.  The second (reported
in  Table  11)  includes  additional  estimates  of  effects  associated  with  specific  intermediaries.
Where  necessary,  we  discuss  (but  do  not  report)  additional  regressions  that  involve  slight
changes  in specification  from  those  reported  here.
The results  reported  in Table  10 for  the entire  sample period  show a large positive  effect
on investment  from  govemr-nent directed  credit.  The sum of the two coefficients  is 0.6,  which
is  much  larger  than  the  analogous  coefficients  for  private  long-term  credit  (0.14)  or  private
short-term  credit  (0.01).  The  sub-period  breakdowns  reveal  large  differences  in  the sizes  of
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1963-1971 and 1982-1991 -- the sum of coefficients for governmenIt  credit is much smaller.  It
remains larger than for private long-term credit, but only slightly, and not significantly. Indeed,
from the standpoint of statistical significance, private long-term credit is clearly significantly
positive, while the same cannot be said of government credit.
These findings provide no conclusive evidence of any effect of directed credit as a whole
for the 1980s (given the large standard errors, the effects could be as large as 0.8 or as small
as 0), but do indicate a large positive effect during the earlier two sub-periods.
The results in Table 11, which distinguish patterns for individual lenders from those of
broad categories of credit, show that the declining impact of govemnment  credit was a feature
of only some government credit programs.  In addition to the regression coefficients reported
in Table 11, Table 16 summarizes total effects by period and by government lender and reports
relevant standard errors.  The effect of non-JDB and non-XMB credit is large and statistically
significant only in the early period.  The coefficients for the JDB indicate that credit from this
source (although estimated with large standard errors in the early period) had a large effect in
all periods (with a point estimate of  1.5 for the effect from JDB lending for the sample as a
whole).  In contrast, the coefficients for the XMB indicate a net effect of roughly 0.2,  which
is insignificantly different from zero.  The effect of non-XMB government credit, particularly
when it came for the JDB, is larger than the estimated effects of private long-term credit or its
components (which sum to 0.24 for the IBJ and 0.15 for the LTCB).
The differences over time in the relative magnitudes of the effects of credit from different
government intermediaries warrant emphasis.  For  1963-1971, the overall government credit
effect is large (likely between 1 and 2),  and the additional coefficients for the JDB and XMB
are  insignificantly different  from the  overall  government credit effect.  We  conclude  that
govermment credit  from  many  sources  had  similarly  large  estimated positive  effects  on
investment during the first sub-period.  For the second and third sub-periods, the effects of non-
JDB credit are much smaller, while the effects of JDB lending remain large and statistically
significant.
To sum up, a close look at the relationships  between directed and private credit, on the
one  hand,  and  investment,  on  the  other hand,  confirm that  some government credit  had
significant, positive effects on investment  during the entire sample period.  Credit from a variety
of government agencies was responsible for the overall effect for the period 1963-1971; during
the  period  1972-1981, the  JDB's  effect was likely  larger  than  the average effect  for  all
governmernt  credit; and by the end of the sample period,  1982-1991, only govermnent credit
through the JDB had an effect, and that effect remained large and statistically significant.
What explains the dramatic decline in the estimated impact of non-JDB credit from the
1960s to the 1980s?  One possible explanation is that the JDB was more selective than other
governent  lenders in its targeting during the later period (when, according to the JDB, 1994,
its goals shifted from targeting consolidation  and rationalization of the industry to targeting high-
23tech producers).  According to this explanation, firms receiving credit from the JDB in the later
periods had greater growth potential than the typical firm receiving credit from other government
agencies.  Similar reasoning can explain the importance of non-JDB, non-XMB govermnent
credit in the early sub-period.  If, as is commonly alleged, the non-JDB, non-XMB government
creditors were given greater responsibility during the 1960s for selective targeting of growing
firms, then this could account for the greater impact of their credit flows during that period.
Government Credit and Private Credit
If government creditors financing fixed  capital investment  simply underbid private lenders
to  secure  the best  clients  --  a  strategy  that  might  appeal  to  a  conservative  bureaucrat  --  then
government lending would have little beneficial effect, even though it might be associated with
the large, positive predictive effects on investment found above.  If government lenders were
simply picking obvious winners, and if the receipt of government credit did not truly relax
borrowing constraints on firms, then government credit flows should be negatively related to
private credit flows.  A simple test, therefore, of whether government credit is effective is to
ask whether it crowds out private funds.
Tables 12 and 13 report  regressions with the (normalized) flow of private long-term
credit as the dependent variable.  The independent variables are the sane  as in Tables 10 and
11, with the exception that private long-term credit and its components are no longer included.
Below, we also discuss effects of govemrnment  credit on short-term pri.'ate credit.
For the sample period as a whole, and for specifications  that only include aggregate credit
categories (reported in Table 12), we find significant crowding in of private long-term credit by
government credit, with  a positive magnitude of roughly 0.3.  '-_s may reflect the  'pump
priming" effect referred to by the JDB (1994) and Horiuchi and Sui (1993), and it is inconsistent
with the view that government lenders simply pick, and bid for, obvious wimers.  "Crowding-
in" coefficients for long-term private credit by government credit are larger than the coefficients
on short-term credit.
The effects of aggregate government credit (Table 12) for the first two sub-periods are
similar in magnitude to that for the period as a whole, while the estimates for the period 1982-
1991 indicate no crowding in or crowding out of long-tenn private credit.  These sub-period
breakdowns mirror the effects of govermment  credit on investment shown in Table 10.
As before, allowing government credit effects to vary across lenders and sub-periods
identifies interesting differences.  As  reported in  Tables  13 and  16, non-JDB,  non-XMB
government credit may have crowded in long-term private credit in the early period, and by the
late period, may have crowded out long-term private credit.  The crowding in effects of JDB
and XMB credit are relatively large and statistically significant in the  1980s.  These results
confirm the increase in the relative importance of the JDB over time in promoting investment.
The only  surprising result  is that XMB credit during the  1980s appears to  be a  source of
crowding in  of private credit in Table  13, wnile in Table  11, loans from the XMB had no
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Tables 14 and 15 report analogous regressions to those of Tables 12 and 13, with private
short-term credit taking the place of private long-term credit as the dependent variable, and
private long-term credit appearing as an independent variable.  As before, Table 16 sununarizes
the  coefficient  effects.  Generally,  we  find  small and  statistically insignificant effects  of
government credit on short-term private credit.  The exceptions -- both during the 1963-1971
period -- are the significant crowding in of short-term credit by the XMB, and the crowding out
by non-JDB, non-XMB government credit.
Overall -- with the possible exception of the negative effects of non-JDB, non-XMB
credit on long-term private credit in the 1980s, and on short-term private credit in the 1960s -
government credit tended to have either positive or zero predictive power for private credit.
Where the JDB and XMB are concerned there is no evidence that their decision to target a
particular fmn  resulted in the crowding out of private funds.  The only consistent crowding in
effects are related to JDB credit.
Summary of Probrt and VAR Results
We  have  reported fmdings of important positive effects from government credit for
investment and private credit, as well as important differences in the magnitudes of these effects
across time and across sources of government credit.  Explanations  for observed differences have
not been explored fully here, as our goal is first to summarize the evidence and point to broad
conclusions.
We  have  argued  against explanations of  the  positive effects  of  directed  credit  on
investment that rely on government creditors simply picking winners, or on the insurance of
credit nsk.  The lack of crowding out of private funds (at least for important categories of
government directed credit) is inconsistent with a policy of simply picking winners.  The probit
results reported in Table 9, and the related discussion in the text, show that government creditors
did not tend to  bail out troubled firms which had previously borrowed  from them.  Firms
experiencing falling sales and profits would always have been unlikely to receive government
credit, and having received it before only made their chances worse.
While  these  arguments and  findings  are  generally  consistent  with  the  view  that
govermment  directed credit promoted investment and private funding for targeted firms, there
is still an alternative explanation for our findings that we are unable to refute.  It is possible that
govermment  interventions coordinated with directed credit - at the firm level - may have made
directed  credit  to  firms  seem  to  produce  growth,  when  in  fact  other  interventions were
responsible.  Of course, interventions  that affected all firms in the industry could not explain our
observed cross-sectional differences;  but it is possible that some important interventions  by MITI
were targeted to specific machine tool producers (or producers with certain common traits) who
were also receiving directed credit.  Ideally, we would like to  be able to control for other
effective subsidies (particularly, tariffs  and import licenses) when measuring the  effects of
25directed credit, but we are currently unable to do so for lack of data.
Based on our reading of the history of industrial policy toward machine tool producers,
we think that controlling for subsidies specifically directed to  individual firms is unlikely to
overturn our results.  Import licenses granted to individual firms were important in the 1950s
and early 1960s (Baily et al.,  1993, JDB, 1994, pp.  190-203), but with the passing of time and
the adoption of more free-market trade policies, frmn-specific import licensing ceased to be a
factor.  For virtually all of our sample period, therefore, other firm-specific interventions seem
an unlikely explanation of the apparent importance of directed credit.
There is still, however, the problem of accounting for the effects of categorical subsidies
or tariffs which may have had different effects on different firns.  It is possible that the same
group of firms that benefitted most from a particular tariff were also targeted as recipients of
credit.
While future researchers may be able to construct alternative explanations of our results,
on the whole onr findings provide evidence that industrial credit market  interventions in the
Japanese machine tool sector have accomplished the stated goals of policy.  Our results on the
characteristics of fnns  receiving credit show that fimis were not able to permanently capture
credit  assistance,  and  that  directed  credit  was  associated  with  identifiable  economic
characteristics of firms.  Government credit was withdrawn quickly from targeted firms, was
targeted toward growing, capital-intensive  firms, and was associated with substantial increases
in investment and access to private credit.
VII.  CONCLUSION
We have discussed the theoretical  justifications for government directed credit programs
for industry, and have argued that in the case of postwar Japanese machine tool producers,
directed credit may have helped to promote investment.  In theory, government can help to
overcome problems due to free riding on investment in monitoring, or externalities in product
or factor markets.  In practice, important components of Japanese directed credit seem to have
spurred growth.  These government credit programs did not crowd out private funds, and did
not succeed because they provided a permanent lifeline ("credit insurance") to firms.
Our findings may shed light on the "gross" benefits of directed credit, but we have not
measured its benefits net of the opportunity costs of directing funds away from other fimns, or
away from consumers.  We  have analyzed firms within one  industry group,  and have not
measured the social costs of depriving other sectors of funds, or of the macroeconomic policies
that underlay the low cost of industrial finance more generally.  Clearly, industrial policy and
directed credit policies must be evaluated ultimately from a general equilibrium perspective,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is also important to keep in mind that industrial credit to infant industries represents
only a small fraction of Japanese directed credit interventions.  Other interventions to smootn
26industrial  decline,  to sponsor  public works,  abate pollution,  etc-,  may have very different  social
costs  and  benefits.  Moreover,  the  political  process  that  gives  rise  to  credit  support  for
construction,  infrastructure,  and public health projects may be different  from,  and possibly  more
subject  to political  manipulation  than,  industrial  credit  to infant industries.
For  all  these  reasons,  our  arguments  do  not  constitute  an endorsement  of  govemrnent
interventions  into credit  markets,  in Japan  or elsewhere.  Moreover,  it is worth  noting  that the
effective  operation  of  industrial  directed  credit  in  Japan  seems  to be an unrepresentative  case.
In many  countries,  government  interventions  have produced  large costs through  the funding  of
inefficient  borrowers  and  the  capture  of  public  funds  by  special  interests.  A  k-ey feature  of
Japanese  industrial  directed credit is the institutional mechanism  through which policy  objectives
are translated  into government  programs.  Policy  is designed  to  minimize  problems  of private
crowding  out,  and  to minimize  capture  of taxpayer  resources  by  individual  firms  or particular
industries.  In Japan,  the priorities  of credit policy are determined  as part of a national plan with
broad  participation  (rather  than by special-interest  lobbying),  and once industry-level  priorities
have  been  established,  firm-level  lending  decisions  by  agencies  are  shielded  from  pGlitical
pressures.  In political  systems that lack the ability to produce  and implement effective  plans  for
the  distribution  of  industrial  credit,  government  directed  credit  programs  may  create  more
problems  than they solve.
Future  work- should  build  on  this  study,  and  that  of  Horiuchi  and  Sui  (1993),  by  (1)
collecting  additional  data on other government  interventions  at the firm level  to measure  more
precisely  the contribution  of directed  credit  to targeted  firms'  growth,  (2)  investigating  further
the  meaning  of the  economic  characteristics  of firns  likely  to  receive  credit,  (3) establishing
whether  changes  in  targeting  policy  underlie  the observed  decreasing  importance  of  ncn-JDlB
credit  over  our period,  and  (4) examining  the links between  the efficacy  of directed  credit  and
a  firm's  ability  to  establish  strong,  long-term  "main  bank'  relationships.  If  the  Japanese
government  truly has served as a vehicle for solving free rider problems among banks and firms,
then,  as .Horiuchi and Sui (1993) argue,  firms with main bank  relationships  should be less likely
to receive  credit  assistance  from  the govermnent,  and government  credit  should  have a smaller
effect  on their behavior.
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30.J  tl  NOTES
1.  This  movement toward  increased scale was a matter of conscious policy.  As the Japan
Development Bank (1994, p. 200) writes of policy circa 1965:
The goal i:n  upgrading plant and equipment was to establish a mass production
system by expanding the size of firms and specializing production.  To this
end, the [machine tooll industry was designated as outside the purview of
the Antimonopoly Law, emphasis was placed on such joint activities as
rationalization cartels, and restrictions were imposed on product standards.
2. One can also make arguments for industrial credit assistance to mature, declining industries.
Such arguments depend on macroeconomic costs of adjustment in labor markets or "coordination
failure" among firms.  For example, recent theoretical models (Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985)
identify efficiency gains from  coordinated capacity reductions.  One can view government
subsidies as a means to overcome an inefficient "prisoner's dilemma."  Without coordinated
reduction, firms would maintain inefficiently high capacity as part of a competitive dynamic
strategy to maintain market share in a declining industry.
3. Recent financial innovations and regulatory changes (see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein,
1990a) have enhanced the desirability of financing outside keiretsus, and adverse shocks to
Japanese bank capital have reduced the advantages of membership.
4. In addition to providing assistanee for growing firms, the Japanese government has provided
credit to declining industries.  More recently, credit has been provided as part of a government
program to encourage capacity reduction.  Unlike many countries, where declining industries
receiving credit never seem to disappear, in Japan declining industries like coal mining have
been forced to shrink in a smooth but steady manner as their workers are retrained for other
occupations.
5.  Horiuchi and Sui (1993) point out that, while joint  loan syndications between the JDB and
private banks can account for gross crowding in of some commercial bank lending, syndication,
per  se,  does not explain net  crowding in.  Instead, net  crowding in  is  associated with  an
increased willingness of private banks to lend to firms, conditional on their receiving government
credit.
6.  Weinstein and Yafeh (1994) argue that main banks do not perform the beneficial function
described above, and see them instead as extortionists that extract rent from borrowers.  Their
evidence for this interpretation, however - that main banks seem to charge higher interest, and
that  the profit  rates of  main  bank-affiliated firms  are lower  on  average - could easily be
interpreted as proving rather than rejecting the standard view of main banking as an effective
long-term contract.  If main banks relax borrowing constraints, they should allow firms to grow
and possibly thereby reduce their average profitability.  (Consistent with this interpretation is
the fact that main bank-affiliated frms  have higher capital ratios.)  Moreover, if main banks are
31able to resolve free rider problems, that may allow them to collect higher interest fees, the
credible payment of which allows efficient intermediation, and is in the interest of the borrower
as well as the banker.
7.  Other important policy makers in directed credit include the Small Business Finance (SBFC)
Corporation and the Bank of Japan (BOJ).  Unlike the others, the BOJ does not lend directly to
firms.  Instead, it operates through "window" policies that encourage private banks to  lend to
specific industries.  Window policy could be a source of measurement error of government
credit in that some privately supplied credit is effectively a  'pass  through" from the central
bank.  Window guidance, however, is not a problem for the results reported below, or those
found in Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994).  First, window guidance was abandoned from 1982
to 1989 (Hoshi, Scharfstein, and Singleton, 1993), and our results are broadly the same for this
and other periods.  Second, window guidance operated at the industry level.  The BOJ favored
banks with loan concentrations in particular industries at particular points in time, but did not
require loans to specific firms.  Thus, window guidance should not matter for studies of firm-
level data that control for industry and time effects.
8.  Note that even in syndications, because the JDB's loan is of much longer term than those by
private commercial banks (roughly 10 years versus 1-2 years),  the JDB maintains "junior"
status, since it is the last to be repaid.  This may provide an important incentive for it to take
the initiative in monitoring firms and enforcing behavior by borrowers.  Thus, even when the
JDB acts as the lead bank in a syndicate, it may still be effectively acting as the "initial" bank
in the sense described above.
9.  The research proposal also outlined an approach for testing for technological spillover effects
across firms, as in Henderson (1994), to panel data.  Pursuing this line of research has not been
possible because, as we discuss below, Japanese data on research and development expenditure
(which was to be the focus of the analysis of spillovers) seem not to be useful for performing
panel data analysis.  The coverage in the data is uneven across firms and across time.
10.  The decline in JDB credit was especially pronounced in the early  1980s for industry 31.
For that industry, from 1981 to  1986, only one firm out of 236 received JDB credit.  After
1986, no sample firms in industry 31 received JDB credit.
11. This view is consistent with the probit results discussed below, which show that governrment
credit assistance is closely associated with lagged investment rates of recipient firms.
12.  As we noted before, the survivorship bias in the JDB tape may have a greater effect during
the 1960s because of greater consolidation and exit during that period.  One potential problem
our analysis does not suffer from is the use of incorrect retrospective data in characterizing
firms'  balance  sheets  and  income statements.  As  we understand  the  JDB's  method  of
constructing the data, fims  that merged were also merged in the data base retroactively for the
years prior to the merger.  To prevent this retrospective bias from influencing our results, before
including fims  in our sample we checked their annual reports to make sure that their actual
balance sheet levels matched those in our data.
32Table 1:  [nvestnenE-to-Capital  Ratios. By Industry over Time.
3-Digit Industrv Code
Year  025  027  029  031
1965  0.204  0.299  0.288  0.202
1966  0.141  0.193  0.191  0.146
1967  0.189  0.242  0.282  0.180
1968  0.274  0.295  0.454  0.259
1969  0.350  0.368  0.320  0.245
1970  0.403  0.438  0.354  0.401
1971  0.347  0.298  0.291  0.367
1972  0.203  0.192  0.205  0.229
1973  0.185  0.230  0.275  0.299
1974  0.255  0.298  0.346  0.265
1975  0.232  0.167  0.170  0.205
1976  0.143  0.133  0.141  0.139
1977  0.107  0.135  0.180  0.155
1978  0.050  0.072  0.094  0.102
1979  0.055  0.089  0.097  0.085
1980  0.087  0.095  0.095  0.117
1981  0.092  0.131  0.124  0.137
1982  0.097  0.148  0.094  0.133
1983  0.080  0.120  0.096  0.085
1984  0.061  0.152  0.084  0.135
1985  0.095  0.154  0.073  0.140
1986  0.066  0.114  0.087  0.102
1987  0.043  0.092  0.070  0.080
1988  0.044  0.068  0.060  0.073
1989  0.065  0.090  0.096  0.114
1990  0.108  0.094  0.094  0.088
1991  0.116  0.114  0.104  0.105
33Table 2:  Operating Income-to-Capital  Ratios. By Industrv over Time.
3-Digit Industrv Code
Year  025  027  029  031
1965  0.224  0.307  0.201  0.286
1966  0.172  0.261  0.204  0.224
1967  0.233  0.326  0.241  0.298
1968  0.358  0.397  0.242  0.352
1969  0.428  0.428  0.208  0.366
1970  0.415  0.423  0.201  0.430
1971  0.356  0.313  0.162  0.310
1972  0.228  0.255  0.141  0.189
1973  0.210  0.298  0.175  0.247
1974  0.276  0.335  0.191  0.309
1975  0.265  0.185  0.161  0.274
1976  0.166  0.158  0.154  0.222
1977  0.162  0.223  0.199  0.260
1978  0.129  0.198  0.147  0.236
1979  0.172  0.233  0.144  0.263
1980  0.232  0.278  0.153  0.319
1981  0.291  0.305  0.166  0.354
1982  0.251  0.275  0.127  0.220
1983  0.163  0.218  0.094  0.209
1984  0.126  0.228  0.095  0.226
1985  0.141  0.226  0.104  0.265
1986  0.094  0.148  0.083  0.172
1987  0.036  0.098  0.061  0.058
1988  0.076  0.128  0.079  0.070
1989  0.154  0.160  0.099  0.136
1990  0.186  0.166  0.111  0.112
1991  0.226  0.162  0.111  0.134
34Table 3:  Sales-to-Capital Ratios. Bv Indusuy over Time.
3-Digit Industrv Code
Year  025  027  029  031
1965  2.618  3.455  2.655  2.821
1966  2.352  3.145  2.702  2.703
1967  2.687  3.593  3.069  2.872
1968  3.343  3.852  3.038  3.231
1969  3.669  4.230  2.710  3.360
1970  3.831  4.382  2.737  3.854
1971  3.621  3.869  2.629  3.510
1972  3.103  3.546  2.325  3.021
1973  3.180  3.741  2.653  3.336
1974  3.682  4.264  3.086  3.782
1975  3.693  3.673  2.716  3.777
1976  3.227  3.497  2.581  3.632
1977  3.148  3.915  2-910  3.951
1978  3.161  3.786  2.701  3.986
1979  3.366  3.888  2.761  3.883
1980  3.572  4.067  2.784  4.106
1981  3.859  4.326  2.714  4.314
1982  3.613  4.072  2.391  3.832
1983  3.264  3.780  2.192  3.402
1984  3.072  3.951  2.146  3.411
1985  3.179  3.852  2.184  3.505
1986  2.877  3.315  2.085  3.166
1987  2.492  3.056  1.875  2.705
1988  2.598  3.147  1.833  2.638
1989  2.934  3.309  1.962  2.863
1990  3.146  3.208  2.001  2.684
1991  3.159  3.223  1.981  2.833
35Table 4A:  Debt-to-Capital Ratio. Loans f  mn Japan Development Bank.
3-Digit Industrv Code
Year  025  027  029  031
1965  0.053  0.050  0.051  0.049
1966  0.041  0.042  0.038  0.038
1967  0.040  0.047  0.041  0.037
1968  0.042  0.041  0.067  0.039
1969  0.037  0.037  0.060  0.027
1970  0.035  0.034  0.058  0.025
1971  0.030  0.026  0.038  0.026
1972  0.028  0.020  0.034  0.013
1973  0.024  0.016  0.038  0.016
1974  0.023  0.026  0.048  0.034
1975  0.021  0.024  0.037  0.047
1976  0.024  0.022  0.031  0.015
1977  0.031  0.022  0.031  0.017
1978  0.025  0.026  0.043  0.022
1979  0.017  0.024  0.030  0.021
1980  0.021  0.021  0.027  0.026
1981  0.026  0.028  0.023  0.034
1982  0.022  0.026  0.031  0.019
1983  0.024  0.020  0.026  0.014
1984  0.018  0.017  0.023  0.007
1985  0.010  0.014  0.016  0.004
1986  0.008  0.011  0.012  0.001
1987  0.009  0.009  0.011
1988  0.009  0.016  0.006
1989  0.011  0.017  0.012
1990  0.013  0.019  0.011
1991  0.027  0.016  0.010
36Table 4B:  Debt-to-Capital Ratio. Loans from Export-Import Bank.
3-DiOJt  Industrv Code
Year  025  027  029  031
1965  0.009  0.018
1966  0.006  0.012
1967  0.009  0.009
1968  0.006  0.024
1969  0.004  0.025
1970  0.017  0.027
1971  0.030  0.022
1972  0.060  0.018
1973  0.040  0.020
1974  0.048  0.025  0.347  0.012
1975  0.030  0.026  0.088  0.022
1976  0.031  0.045  0.085  0.018
1977  0.036  0.040  0.085  0.020
1978  0.038  0.030  0.081  0.013
1979  0.036  0.021  0.060  0.009
1980  0.038  0.019  0.046  0.006
1981  0.059  0.023  0.013  0.004
1982  0.050  0.030  0.008
1983  0.046  0.026  0.033
1984  0.037  0.022  0.032
1985  0.013  0.018  0.020
1986  0.036  0.014  0.020
1987  0.113  0.012  0.014
1988  0.199  0.009  0.001
1989  0.083  0.009  0.003
1990  0.076  0.007  0.025
1991  0.072  0.009  0.025
373-Digit  Industrv  Code
Year  025  027  029  031
1965  0.061  0.068  0.125  0.127
1966  0.072  0.075  0.096  0.112
1967  0.058  0.084  0.098  0.093
1968  0.068  0.080  0.098  0.077
1969  0.089  0.085  0.091  0.095
1970  0.078  0.078  0.078  0.208
1971  0.071  0.076  0.074  0.190
1972  0.060  0.070  0.088  0.118
1973  0.061  0.066  0.100  0.113
1974  0.079  0.071  0.075  0.134
1975  0.083  0.077  0.073  0.118
1976  0.087  0.070  0.074  0.133
1977  0.077  0.066  0.066  0.134
1978  0.073  0.060  0.059  0.120
1979  0.062  0.054  0.069  0.112
1980  0.057  0.054  0.073  0.108
1981  0.058  0.051  0.063  0.103
1982  0.066  0.041  0.067  0.106
1983  0.057  0.044  0.064  0.106
1984  0.059  0.035  0.053  0.108
1985  0.059  0.027  0.047  0.100
1986  0.048  0.024  0.042  0.079
1987  0.042  0.022  0.041  0.093
1988  0.040  0.019  0.039  0.085
1989  0.058  0.019  0.028  0.097
1990  0.044  0.018  0.026  0.086
1991  0.052  0.015  0.022  0.088
383-Digit  Industrv  Code
Year  025  027  029  031
1965  0.075  0.085  O0037  0.061
1966  0.082  0.084  0.053  0.044
1967  0.074  0.069  0.041  0.032
1968  0.077  0.077  0.080  0.030
1969  0.072  0.079  0.074  0.048
1970  0.076  0.077  0.075  0.070
1971  0.064  0.069  0.073  0.061
1972  0.060  0.070  0.062  0.053
1973  0.053  0.067  0.065  0.034
1974  0.050  0.066  0.076  0.043
1975  0.048  0.066  0.082  0.057
1976  0.055  0.060  0.068  0.063
L977  0.054  0.059  0.061  0.074
1978  0.051  0.055  0.055  0.065
1979  0.043  0.059  0.074  0.058
1980  0.043  0.055  0.060  0.062
1981  0-043  0.053  0.073  0.045
1982  0.048  0.048  0.069  0.055
1983  0.042  0.053  0.070  0.041
1984  0.042  0.027  0.056  0.015
1985  0.041  0.030  0.018  0.011
1986  0.043  0.042  0.017  0.019
1987  0.045  0.042  0.022  0.016
1988  0.068  0.034  0.109  0.016
1989  0.039  0.032  0.106  0.014
1990  0.033  0.019  0.077  0.012
1991  0.034  0.017  0.070  0.009
39Table  5:  "Start"  Probits.  by  Bank.
Bank
JDB  XMB  JDB or  IBJ  LTCB
XMB
Consant  -3.015  -3.208  -2.567  -2.101  -1.189
(0.463)  (0.449)  (0.435)  (0.515)  (0.532)
(SIK),-,  -0.133  -0.029  -0.035  0.040  0.111
(0.068)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.049)  (0.031)
(QlIK)~,  0.523  -0.272  0.041  -0.725  -0.662
(0.440)  (0.412)  (0.371)  (0.421)  (0.378)
(-lK),  1.250  0.976  0.923  0.981  0.774
(0.340)  (0.346)  (0.314)  (0.359)  (0.350)
%8AS,  00190  0.845  0.532  0.447  0.832
(0.452)  (0.402)  (0.383)  (0.404)  (0.388)
log(S)  0.065  0.071  0.013  -0.056  -0.181
(0.042)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.050)  (0.056)
loglikelihood  -206.302  -232.145  -256.860  -188.173  -190.637
Footnotes:  Standard  errors  appear  in parenthesis.  Variable  abbreviations:  (SJK)  =  the ratio
of sales  to capital;  (OI/K)  =  the ratio  of operating  income  to capital;  (NI/K)  =  the ratio of
net  investment to  capital;  % A(Sales)  =  the growth  rate of sales;  log(Sales)  =  the  log of
sales.
40Table 6:  "Have'  Probits - Full Time Period.  1963-1991.
Bank Lender
Regressors  IDB  XMB  All Gov't  IBI  LTCB
Constant  -1.649  -5.542  -2.008  -1.879  -2.554
(0.159)  (0.217)  (0.256)  (0.144)  (0.149)
(SlK)  -0.259  -0.083  -0.321  -0.053  0.066
(0.020)  (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.013)  (0.013)
(01/K)  0.280  -0.564  0.318  0.308  -0.866
(0.164)  (0.219)  (0.249)  (0.131)  (0.138)
(NI/K)  1.875  0.941  1.476  0.219  0.842
(0.154)  (0.204)  (0.226)  (0.139)  (0.143)
%A(Sales)  0.438  0.435  0.031  0.806  0.348
(0.153)  (0.213)  (0.201)  (0.135)  (0.141)
log(Sales)  0.132  0.428  0.223  0.175  0.185
(0.015)  (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.014)
Total Obs.  4451  4451  4451  4451  4451
# Obs= 1  1048  491  2985  1894  1427
Log Likelihood  -2206  -1244  -2734  -2947  -2667
Footnotes:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Variable abbreviations: (SIK) = the
ratio of sales to capital; (OI/K) = the ratio of operating income to capital; (NI/K) =  the
ratio of net investment to capital; %A(Sales) =  the growth rate of sales; log(Sales) =  the
log of sales.
41Table 7a:  "Have" Probits - Japan Development  Bank. by Time Period.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Samnpie  63-71  72-81  82-91
Constant  -1.649  -1.266  -2.008  -2.755
(0.159)  (0-461)  (0.256)  (0.258)
(S/K)  -0.259  -0.325  -0.321  -0.198
(0.020)  (0.058)  (0.029)  (0.03  1)
(OIK)  0.280  -0.338  0.318  0.185
(0.164)  (0.422)  (0.249)  (0.287)
(NIIK)  1.875  1.696  1.476  0.376
(0.154)  (0.348)  (0.226)  (0.390)
%A(Sales)  0.438  0.662  0.031  0.380
(0.153)  (0.479)  (0.201)  (0.307)
log(Sales)  0.132  0.163  0.223  0.208
(0.015)  (0.050)  (0.026)  (0.024)
Total Obs.  4451  474  1842  2135
#  Obs= l  1048  185  542  321
Log Likelihood  -2206  -276  -985  -840
Footnotes:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Variable abbreviations: (S/K) = the
ratio of sales to capital; (OIK)  =  the ratio of operating income to capital; (NIIK) =  the
ratio of net investment  to  capital;  %A(Sales) =  the  growth rate of sales; log(Sales) =  the
log of sales.
42Table 7b:  "Have" Probits - Export-import Bank. by Time Period.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
Constant  -5.542  -6.436  -5.711  -7.757
(0.218)  (0.794)  (0.326)  (0.427)
(S/K)  -0.084  -0.114  -0.121  -0.087
(0.021)  (0.093)  (0.030)  (0.038)
(0aK)  -0.563  -2.004  -0.745  -0.656
(0.219)  (0.894)  (0.298)  (0.459)
(NIIK)  0.941  0.423  0.433  -0.771
(0.204)  (0.582)  (0.285)  (0.646)
%A(Sales)  0.435  0.162  0.183  0.368
(0.213)  (0.980)  (0.256)  (0.502)
log(Sales)  0.428  0.609  0.511  0.596
(0.019)  (0.081)  (0.032)  (0.037)
Total Obs.  4451  474  1842  2135
# Obs= 1  491  38  299  154
Log Likelihood  -1244  -89  -651  -367
Footnotes:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Variable abbreviations: (S/K) =  the
ratio of sales to  capital;  (OI/K)  =  dhe ratio of operating  income to  capital;  (NI/K)  =  the
ratio of net investment  to capital;  %A(Sales)  =  the growth  rate  of sales;  log(Sales)  =  the
log of sales.
- 43Table 7c:  Directed Credit "Have" Probits - All Government Banks. by Time Period.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
Constant  -0.001  -2.252  -0.527  -1.737
(0.146)  (0.610)  (0.276)  (0.213)
(SK)  -0.056  -0.167  -0.121  -0.027
(0.013)  (0.048)  (0.022)  (0.018)
(OI/K)  -0.681  0.038  -1.082  -0.824
(0.133)  (0.421)  (0.213)  (0.204)
(NM/K)  1.553  0.842  1.348  -0.105
(0.158)  (0.381)  (0.261)  (0.295)
%A(Sales)  0.540  0.904  -0.051  0.537
(0.140)  (0.552)  (0.210)  (0.231)
log(Sales)  0.049  0.363  0.163  0.130
(0.014)  (0.072)  (0.029)  (0.020)
Total Obs.  4451  474  1842  2135
#  Obs= 1  2985  379  1469  1137
Log Likelihood  -2733  -210  -860  -1441
Footnotes:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Variable abbreviations; (SIK) =  the
ratio of sales to capital; (O01K)  = the ratio of operating income to capital; (NIIK) =  the
ratio of net investment to capital; %A(Sales) =  the growth rate of sales; log(Sales) = the
log of sales.
44Table 8a:  Directed Credit "Have" Probits - Industrial Bank of Japan. bv Time Period.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
Constant  -1.879  -2.584  -2.511  -2.051
(0.144)  (0.460)  (0.245)  (0.219)
(S/K)  -0.052  -0.142  -0.070  -0.029
(0.013)  (0.045)  (0.020)  (0.018)
(OIK)  0.30B  0.512  0.276  0.166
(0.131)  (0.385)  (0.198)  (0.208)
(NIMK)  0.219  0.049  0.030  -0.882
(0.140)  (0.315)  (0.212)  (0.313)
%A(Sales)  0.086  0.353  -0.352  0.079
(0.134)  (0.462)  (0.183)  (0.237)
log(Sales)  0.174  0.264  0.270  0.181
(0.014)  (0.051)  (0.025)  (0.021)
Total Obs-  4451  474  1842  2135
# Obs= L  1894  211  863  620
Log  Likelihood  -2948  -300  -1206  -1381
Foomotes:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Variable abbreviations: (SIK) = the
ratio of sales to capital; (OK  =  the ratio of operating income to capital; (NI/K) =  the
ratio of net investment  to capital; %A(Sales)  =  the growEh  rate of sales; log(Sales) =  the
log of sales.
45Table gb:  Directed Credit "Have" Probits - Long Term Credit Bank of Japan. bv Time
Period.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
Constant  -2.554  4.648  -3.388  -2.566
(0.149)  (0.535)  (0.251)  (0.230)
(SJK)  0.066  -0.051  0.040  0.108
(0.013)  (0.049)  (0.020)  (0.019)
(O/K)  -0.866  -1.404  -0.975  -0.930
(0.138)  (0.435)  (0.205)  (0.229)
(NIIK)  0.842  0.218  0.615  -0.336
(0.143)  (0.342)  (0.215)  (0.327)
%A(Sales)  0.348  0.362  0.152  0.024
(0.141)  (0.493)  (0.188)  (0.254)
log(Sales)  0.184  0.529  0.307  0.166
(0.014)  (0.060)  (0.025)  (0.022)
Total Obs.  4451  474  1842  2135
# Obs=  1  1427  172  703  552
Log Likelihood  -2667  -254  -1133  -1170
Footnotes:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Variable abbreviations: (SIK) =  the
ratio of sales to capital; (OVIK)  = the ratio of operating income to capital; (NI/K)  =  the
ratio of net investment to capital; %A(Sales) =  the growth rate of sales: log(Sales) =  the
log of sales.
46Table 9:  'Initial Loan'  Probits. Conditional on Previous Access to
Govermnent Credit
Bank
Regressors  JDB  XMB  JDB or XMB
Constant  -2.630  -3.291  -2.959
(0.476)  (0.436)  (0.418)
(SW)  -0.113  -0.027  -0.076
(0.04g)  (0.039)  (0.038)
(01/K)  0.211  -0.028  0.162
(0.352)  (0.341)  (0.309)
(NIIK)  1.039  0.825  0.713
(0.282)  (0.276)  (0.262)
%A(Sales)  0.645  0.375  0-682
(0.348)  (0.324)  (0.300)
log(Sales)  0.036  0.085  0.056
(0.041)  (0.037)  (0.056)
Previous IDB  -0.168  0.209  -0.135
Loan Dummy  (0-114)  (0.114)  (0.099)
Previous XMB  0.241  -0.092  -0.111
Loan Dummy  (0.142)  (0.138)  (0.139)
Total Obs.  5999  5939  5999
# Obs=l  50  60  69
Log Likelihood  -272  -323  -364
Footnotes:  Standard errors appear in parentheses.  Variable
abbreviations: (S/K) = the ratio of sales to capital; (OI/K) =  the ratio
of operating income to capital; (NII  =  the ratio of net investment to
capital; %A(Sales) =  the growth rate of sales; log(Sales) =  the log of
sales.
47Table  10: Investment Regressions. Directed Credit Aggregated over  1ll Lenders.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
(NIIK). 1 0.376  0.476  0.342  0.324
(0.015)  (0.050)  (0.022)  (0.023)
(S/K)  0.041  0.067  0.032  0.038
(0.004)  (0.022)  (0.006)  (0.005)
(SIK),  -0.043  -0.077  -0.034  -0.039
(0.004)  (0.023)  (0.006)  (0.005)
(OIK)  0.102  0.193  0.124  0.027
(0.0°  )  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.026)
(01/K).,  0.081  0.059  0.052  0.142
(0.019)  (0.107)  (0.025)  (0.024)
(SFIK)  0.055  0.039  0.051  0.058
(0.013)  (0.067)  (0.018)  (0.017)
(SFIK)  l  -0.043  0.001  -0.058  -0.031
(0.013)  (0.064)  (0.018)  (0.017)
PFlK)  0.160  0.289  0-152  0.085
(0.017)  (0.071)  (0.024)  (0.024)
(PF/K)  -0.022  -0.020  -0.008  -0.040
(0.017)  (0.080)  (0.023)  (0.025)
(GFlK)  0.915  1.090  0.988  0.303
(0.122)  (0.439)  (0.150)  (0.233)
(GF(K)-,  -0.307  -0.074  -0.393  -0.249
(0.123)  (0.43 1)  (0.164)  (0.201)
R  2  0.261  0.323  0.277  0.201
Obs  4470  477  1841  2150
Footnotes:  Year dummies included but not reported.  Standard errors appear in
parentheses.  Variable abbreviations: (NI/K) =  the ratio of net investment  to capital;
(S/K)  =  the ratio of sales to capital; (OK)  =  the ratio of operating income to capital;
(SF/K) = the ratio of short term bank financing to capital; (PF/K) = the ratio of private
long term bank financing to capital; (GF/K) =  the ratio of government long term bank
financing to capital; (IF/K) =  the ration of E1J financing to capital; (LF/K) =  the ratio
of LTCB financing to capital; (JFIK) =  the ratio of JDB financing to capital; (XF/K) =
the ratio of XMB financing to capital.
48Table  I:  Investment Regressions. Directed Credit Disaggregated by Lender.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
(NIIK)- 1 0.375  0.460  0.345  0.328
(0.015)  (0.051)  (0.022)  (0.023)
(S/K)  0.041  0.065  0.033  0.039
(0.0004)  (0.022)  (0.006)  (0.005)
(SIK)- 1 -0.043  -0.074  -0.034  -0.040
(0.004)  (0.023)  (0.006)  (0.005)
(OIIK)  0.102  0.216  0.120  0.026
(0.019)  (0.1011  (0.025)  (0.026)
(O/K).,  0.081  0.029  0.053  0.141
(0.019)  (0.108)  (0.025)  (0.024)
(SF[K)  0.055  0.048  0.050  0.056
(0.013)  (0.684)  (0.018)  (0.017)
(SF/K)..  -0.043  0.013  -0.057  -0.033
(0.013)  (0.065)  (0.018)  (0.017)
(PF/K)  0.146  0.222  0.160  0.083
(0.019)  (0.078)  (0.025)  (0.027)
(PFIK).,  -0.021  -0.024  0.007  -0.053
(0.018)  (0.086)  (0.024)  (0.027)
(GFIK)  0.927  1.565  1.199  -0.087
(0.207)  (0.784)  (0.274)  (0.320)
(GFIK).,  -0.248  0.796  -0.700  -0.351
(0-205)  (0.739)  (0.280)  (0.311)
(IFIK)  0.208  0594  -0.122  0.313
(0.096)  (0.308)  (0.126)  (0.180)
(IF/K)-,  -0.164  -0.006  -0.292  -0.140
(0.09')  (0.314)  (0.115)  (0.172)
(LF/K)  L). 112  0.708  0.019  -0.374
4.J.  122)  (0.459)  (0.149)  (0.232)
(LF/K).,  -0.172  -1.201  0.253  0.559
(0.281)  (0.897)  (0.384)  (0.520)
(F/K)  0.380  -0.703  0.481  0.864
(0.290)  (0.967)  (0.390)  (0.546)
(IF/K). 1 0.170  0.288  -0.104  0.768
(0.120)  (0.464)  (0.145)  (0.230)
(XF/K)  -0.735  1.565  -1.271  0.644
(0.329)  (1.982)  (0.385)  (0.725)
(XF/K).,  0.215  4.524  1.173  -0.144
(0.349)  (2.971)  (0.444)  (0.493)
0.263  0.327  0.288  0.207
Obs.  4470  477  1841  2150
Footnotes:  Year dummies included but not reported.  Standard errors appear in
parentheses.  For variable definitions, see footnotes to Table 10.
49Table  12:  Long-Term  Financing  Regressions  [Flow  of Private  Bank Debt).  Directed
Credit  Aggregated  over  All Lenders.
Time  Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
(PF/K).,  0.134  0.082  0.197  0.046
(0.015)  (0.005)  (0.022)  (0.022)
(S/K)  -0.009  0.007  -0.008  -4.011
(0.003)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.004)
(S/K).,  0.009  -0.009  0.012  0.011
(0.003)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.004)
(OI/K)  -0.040  0.017  -0.046  -0.059
(0.016)  (0.066)  (0.025)  (0.022)
(0IK). 1 0.024  0.019  -0.002  0.053
(0.016)  (0.071)  (0.025)  (0.022)
(SFIK)  0.086  0.121  0.106  0.052
(0.011)  (0.044)  (0.018)  (0.015)
(SF/r) 1- 0.062  0.122  0.044  0.062
(0.011)  (0.042)  (0.018)  (0.015)
(GFIK)  0.293  0.412  0.217  0.301
(0.105)  (0.286)  (0.148)  (0.206)
(GFIK).,  -0.010  -0.055  0.229  -0.322
(0.106)  (0.284)  (0.160)  (0.178)
RZ  0.061  0.042  0.097  0.036
Obs  4470  477  1841  2150
Foomotes:  Year  dummies  included but not reported.  Standard  errors  appear  in
parentheses.  For variable  definitions,  see footnotes  to Table  10.
50Table 13:  Long-Term Financing Regressions (Flkiw  of Private Bank Debt). Directed
Credit Disaggregated bv Lender.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
(PF/K),  0.136  0.080  0.195  0.047
(0.015)  (0.054)  (0.022)  (0.023)
(S/K)  -0.008  0.007  -0.009  -0.011
(0.003)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.004)
(SIK). 1 0.009  -0.009  0.012  0.012
(0.003)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.004)
(01(K)  -0.040  0.018  -0.045  -0.056
(0.016)  (0.066)  (0.025)  (0.022)
(Ol/K),  0.024  0.018  -0.002  0.048
(0.016)  (0.071)  (0.025)  (0.022)
(SF/K)  0.085  0.130  0.106  0.053
(0.011)  (0.044)  (0.0l8)  (0.015)
(SFIK).,  0.062  0.122  0.045  0.063
(0.011)  (0.042)  (0.018)  (0.015)
(GF/K)  0.126  0.685  0.139  -0.374
(0.179)  (0.514)  (0.273)  (0.281)
(GFIK).,  0.035  -0.048  0.389  -0.527
(0.120)  (0.290)  (0.183)  (0.216)
(JiFK)  0.367  -0.261  0.186  1.442
(0.250)  (0.635)  (0.385)  (0.481)
(iF/K)..t  -0.056  -0.081  -0.018  -0.062
(0.104)  (0.302)  (0.143)  (0.202)
(XFIK)  0.138  -2.174  0.140  1.535
(0.285)  (1.297)  (0.382)  (0.639)
(XFIK).,  -0.241  1.879  -0.711  0.499
(0.270)  (1.918)  (0.390)  (0.395)
R2 0.062  0.040  0.097  0.040
Obs.  4470  477  1841  2150
Footnotes:  Year dummies included but not reported.  Standard errors appear in
parentheses.  For variable definitions, see footnotes to Table 10.
51Table  14:  Short-Term Financing Regressions (Flow of Private Bank Debt), Directed
Credit Aggregated over All Lenders.
Time Period
Regressors  Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
(SFIK)- 1 0.078  0.160  0.072  0.06
(0.015)  (0.044)  (0.023)  (0.022)
(S/K)  0.022  0.045  0.012  0.027
(0.004)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.006)
(S/K). 1 -0.011  -0.038  -0.005  -0.013
(0.004)  (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.006)
(01/K)  -0.212  -0.286  -0.186  -0.215
(0.021)  (0.068)  (0.032)  (0.032)
(OI/K).,  0.185  0.299  0.198  0.142
(0.021)  (0.074)  (0.033)  (0.031)
.>  .'K)  0.184  0.110
(0.019)  (0.048)  (0.030)  (0.031)
kPF/K). 1 -0.049  0.247  0.023  -0.001
(0.020)  (0.053)  (0.029)  (0.032)
(GF/K)  -0.030  -0.302  0.029  0.158
(0.139)  (0.302)  (0.195)  (0.299)
(GFIK). 1 0.230  0.208  0.082  0.437
(0.140)  (0.299)  (0.211)  (0.258)
RZ  0.072  0.140  0.075  0.057
Obs  4470  477  1841  2150
Footnotes:  Year dummies included but not reported.  Standard errors appear in
parentheses.  For variable definitions, see footnotes to Table 10.
.52Table  15:  Short-Term  Financinz  Regressions  (Flow  of Private  Bank Debt)  Directed
Credit  Disaggregated  bv Lender.
Time  Period
Regressors  Full Sampie  63-71  72-81  82-91
(SF/K).,  0.076  0.144  0.074  0.058
(0.015)  (0.044)  (0.023)  (0.022)
(SK)  0.022  0.041  0.013  0.029
(0.004)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.006)
(SIK)- 1 -0.011  -0.034  -0.006  -0-014
(0.004)  (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.006)
(01/K)  -0.212  -0.233  -0.189  -0.218
(0.021)  (0.068)  (0.032)  (0.032)
(Ol/K).,  0.184  0.298  0.201  0.145
(0.021)  (0.073)  (0.033)  (0.031)
(PFIK)  0.134  0.159  0.153  0.113
(0.021)  (0.053)  (0.033)  (0.034)
(PFIK)-,  0.029  0.219  0.017  -0.045
(0.021)  (0.058)  (0.031)  (0.035)
(GFIK)  -0.228  -2.048  0.353  -0.021
(0.237)  (0.531)  (0.360)  (0.411)
(GF/K).1 0.162  0.053  0.034  0.338
(0.235)  (0.507)  (0.365)  (0.399)
(IFAK)  0.118  -0.055  0.239  -0.003
(0.110)  (0.211)  (0.165)  (0.230)
(IF/K)-,  0.240  0.308  0.008  0.685
(0.104)  (0.214)  (0.151)  (0.221)
(LF!K)  0.289  -0.224  0.538  0.101
(0.140)  (0.316)  (0.195)  (0.297)
(LFIK)-,  0.161  -0.107  0.183  0.891
(0.322)  (0.617)  (0.503)  (0.667)
(JF/K)  0.305  2.259  -0.443  0.115
(0.333)  (0.655)  (0.5 10)  (0.701)
(JFIK)-.  0.195  0.262  0.033  0.456
(0.138)  (0.318)  (0.190)  (0.294)
(XF/K)  0.254  4.308  -0.671  0.897
(0.377)  (1.341)  (0-505)  (0.931)
(XFJ  K).-  -0.172  0.972  0.030  -0.666
(0.399)  (2.038)  (0.581)  (0.633)
RF  0.075  0.166  0.076  0.062
Obs.  4470  477  1841  2150
Footnotes:  Year dummies included but not reported.  Standard errors appear in
parentheses.  For variable definitions, see footnotes to Table 10.
53Table  16: Summarv of Total Directed Credit Effects.  by Lender.
This  table  reports  the  total  effect of  the  respective  government  lenders  by  adding the
incremental effect of directed credit from the Japan Development Bank and the Export-Import
Bank to the baseline "government bank'  effect, and then summing this effect over both years.
These estimates are taken from Tables 11, 13, and 15.  Thus, for example. the entry below in
the first row of the first column indicates the sum of both the current and lagged  coefficients
on GFIK and JF/K,  and reports standard errors that account for the covariance among those
estimates.
Time Period
Full Sample  63-71  72-81  82-91
Investment Regressions  (see Table 11)
Japan Develop-.  1.478  1.151  1.576  i.545
ment Bank  (0.231)  (0.723)  (0.298)  (0.503)
Export-Imporc  0.159  -0.598  0.406  0.063
Bank  (0.320)  (2.422)  (0.369)  (0.653)
Other Gov't  0.679-  2.361  0.503  -0.438
Banks  (0.292)  (1.081)  (0.383)  (0.464)
Lon1-Term Financing ReEressions (see Table 13)
Japan Develop-.  0.442  0.326  0.358  0.955
ment Bank  (0.197)  (0.467)  (0.292)  (0.442)
Export-Import  0.058  0-310  -0.033  1-135
Bank  (0.277)  (1.602)  (0.366)  (0.577)
Other Gov't  0.089  0.985  0.207  -0.736
Banks  (0.252)  (0.710)  (0.380)  (0.408)
Short-Term Financinz Regressions  (see Table 15)
Japan Develop-.  0.272  0.473  -0.057  0.550
ment Bank  (0.264)  (0.490)  (0.390)  (0.646)
Export-Import  0.016  3.285  -0.254  0.548
Bank  (0.367)  (1.659)  (0.484)  (0.838)
Other Gov't  -0.066  -1.995  0.387  0.317
Banks  (0.334)  (0.737)  (0.501)  (0.595)
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Investment vs. Long Term Bank Debt
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Investment vs. Total Govemment Debt
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57Figure 4
Investment vs. XMB Debt
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Investment vs. Long Term Commercial Bank Debt
0.5  0.5
0.4  %  0.4
0.  -- 02
0.1  - 0.1 0.20
0  I  I  I  I  '  I  I  I  I  ,  I  I  I0@1--  '  ,  1  1  s  _  _ 
63  65  67  69  71  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91
Year
Investment  to Capital Ratio
Long-Term  Commercial  Bank Debt  to Capital Ratio
59Figure 6
[nvestment vs. IBJ plus LTCB Debt
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61Figure 8
Investment vs. Short Term Bank Debt
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